Market and Organizational Factors Associated with Teaching Hospital Participation in Strategic Hospital Alliances by Bramble, James D
Virginia Commonwealth University
VCU Scholars Compass
Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
1998
Market and Organizational Factors Associated with




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd
Part of the Medicine and Health Sciences Commons
© The Author
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars Compass. For more information, please contact libcompass@vcu.edu.
Downloaded from
http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/4390
SCHOOL OF ALLIED HEALTH PROFESSIONS 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 
VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY 
This is to certify that the dissertation prepared by James D. Bramble, Market and 
Organizational Factors Associated with Teaching Hospital Participation in Strategic Hospital 
Alliances, has been approved by his committee as satisfactory completion of the dissertation 
requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Committee: 
mmitteeM er 
School of Medicine 
D&�Ol of Allied Health Professions 
Dean, chool of Graduate Studies 
(Date) 
© James D .  Bramble 
All Rights Reserved 
1 9 9 8  
Market and Organizational Factors Associated with Teaching 
Hospital Participation in Strategic Hospital Alliances 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
by 
James D. Bramble 
M.P.H., University of Oklahoma, 1993 
B.S., University of Utah, 1991 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Richmond, Virginia 
March 1998 
i i  
Acknowledgements 
Like many accompli shments , this research al ong with my 
doctoral studies would not have been successful without the 
support and help of col leagues , friends , and fami ly . I woul d  
l ike to gratefully a cknowledge some of those that have been 
especially important to me in pursuit of my goal s .  
I am grateful to Dr . Roice Luke for sharing his t ime , 
expert ise , and insights . I have benef ited greatly from the 
opportunity to work with him on many research proj ect s . His 
counci l  and advice has been appreciated and helpful in my 
professional development . with his guidance as a col l eague 
and mentor I have learned much about l ocal hospital systems 
and networks and have gained valuable research and wri t i ng 
experience . His contribution to this research was crucial to 
i t s  success . 
Addi tional ly, the other members of my commi ttee 
provided important scholarly guidance , expert ise , and 
support . Dr . Louis Rossiter,  Dr . Kenneth White , and Dr . 
Wally Smith all have helped me to think through ideas , draw 
conclusions , and improve and ref ine this research . Thei r  
insightful comment s ,  along with Dr . Luke ' s ,  has made this 
i i i  
di s sertat ion better . They have been great t o  work with and I 
am grateful for their contributions . 
I would also l ike to acknowledge a number of people who 
did not serve on my committee but had an important role in 
my success . Drs . Jim Begun and Mike McCue , both served as 
the Director of the Doctoral Program during my studies and 
were sources of support and guidance and opportuni ties that 
furthered my development as a health services researcher . My 
fellow student col leagues , especially,  Laura Tyler,  Jin-Yuan 
Chern , and Ken White for their help , support , and friendship 
as we progressed towards complet ing our doctorate educat ion . 
Ms . Carroll George and Ms . Bev DeShazo provided me with much 
needed assi stance with many of the admini strat ive 
requirements necessary to complete my degree . 
Personally, I would l ike to thank my parents for 
ins t i l l ing me with the value of education and the foundat ion 
necessary to accomplish this goal . I want to especially 
thank my wi fe , Lori for her understanding , support , and 
sacri fice during the many years of school and throughout the 
dissertation proj ect . Lori and our son Spencer provided me 
with much j oy and a perspective of what real ly matters . 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgement s 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables 
List of Figures 
Abstract 
Chapter 1 .  Introduct i on 
Teaching Hospitals 
Def ining Teaching Hospitals 
Organi zational Structure of Teaching Hospitals 
Characteri stics of Teaching Hospi tals 
Industry Changes in the Health Care Environment 
COTHs and a Changing Health Care Environment 
S igni f icance of the Study 
Chapter 2 .  Theoretical Foundat ion 
Organizat ions and Inst i tutional Environments 
Teaching Hospitals in an Institutional Environment 
The Use of Interorganizat ional Rel ationships 
Emergence of the Strategic Hospi tals Al l i ance 
S HAs as Interorgani zat ional Arrangements 
in Health Care . . . .  
COTH Typology . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Development of Hypotheses . . . . . . 
The Influence of Coercive Pressures 
The Influence of Normat ive Pressures 
Organi zat ional and Market Dominance 
Chapter 3 .  Methodology . . . .  
Variable Sources and Measurement 
Database Descript ion and Data Sources 
Dependent Variables 
I ndependent Variables . . . . . . . 
Def ining the Market . . . . . . . 
Measures of Coercive Market Pressures 
Measures of Normat ive Pressures 
I ndependent Control variables 
iv 













2 5  
2 7  
3 6  
3 8  
4 1  
4 4  
4 7  
5 8  
5 8  
5 9  
6 1  
6� 
6 5  
6 5  
6 7  
6 8  
6 8  
6 9  
7 5  
7 8  
Analysi s  . . . . .  . 
Logistic Regression 
Chapter 4 .  Resul ts 
Descript ive and Correlat ion Analys i s  
Analys i s  1 :  COTH Part icipation i n  SRAs 
Analys i s  2 :  Market Dominance of COTHs 
Analys i s  3 .  Organi zational Dominance of COTHs 
Chapter 5 .  Discuss ion and Conclusions 
Influence on SRA Parti c ipation 
Influence on COTH Market Dominance 
Influence on Organi zat ional Dominance 
Findings across Analyses 
Study Limitat ions 
Implicat ions . . . .  
Suggest ions for Further Research 
References 
Appendix 1 .  Independent COTH Members 
Appendix 2 .  Integrated COTH Members 
Vita 
v 
8 0  
8 1  
83  
83  
8 7  
92 
96 
1 0 0  
1 0 3  
1 0 5  
1 0 9  
1 1 0  
1 1 2  
1 1 6  
1 2 1  
1 2 4  
1 3 7  










List of Tables 
Number of Inpat ient Services and 
Geographical Distribution of COTHs 
and Community Hospitals . . . . . . 
Summary of the D i fferences between COTH 
Members and Community Hospitals . . 
Variables Measuring Market Pressure 
variables Measuring the Organi zational 
Structure 
vi 
1 1  
1 2  
73  
76  
Independent Control Variables 7 9  
Means and Standard Deviat ions for Cont inuous 
Variables (n = 2 74 )  . . . . .  . . . . .  8 4  
Frequency of Categorical Variables (n= 2 74 ) . 8 5  
Logi stic Parameter Est imates o f  Teaching 
Hospital Part i cipation in Strategic Hospital 
Al l i ances (n=2 74 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9  
Table 9 Logi stic Parameter Est imates of Teaching 
Hospital Market Dominance (n = 2 7 4 )  9 4  
Table 1 0  Logist i c  Parameter Estimates o f  Teaching 
Hospital Organi zat ional Dominance in 
Strategic Hospital Al l iances (n = 1 82 ) . . 9 7  
Table 1 1  Summary o f  Signi f icant Explanatory Variables 
and their Relat ionships with the Dependent 
Variables . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  102 
vii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 Theoret ical Conceptuali zation of Isomorphic 
Pressures . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5  
Figure 2 Typology o f  the Organizat ional and Market 
pos it ion of Teaching Hospi tals . . . .  5 2  
Figure 3 I l lustration of Teaching Hospitals Typology . 5 7  
Figure 4 Conceptual Model o f  Teaching Hospital 
Part icipat ion in SHAs and their Market and 
Organi zational Dominance . . . . . . . 6 3  
v i i i  
Abstract 
MARKET AND ORGANI ZATIONAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH TEACHING. 
HOSPITAL PARTICIPATION IN STRATEGIC HOSPITAL ALLIANCES 
James D .  Bramble , Ph . D .  
Virginia Commonwealth University, 1 9 9 8  
Maj or Director : Roice D .  Luke , Ph . D .  
Thi s  research invest igated market and organi zat ional 
factors that influence the strategic dec isions of teaching 
hospi tals to part ic ipate in strategic hospital all iances 
( SHAs ) . I t  described the characteri stics of both teaching 
hospitals and the health care envi ronment in which they 
operate . This research also examines the assoc iat ion of 
these factors with the strategic position of teaching 
hospitals in terms of their dominance in the market or 
within their organi zat ions . 
The theoretical model used two concepts from 
ins t itut ional theory- - coerc ive and normative pressures . I t  
was argued that coercive pressures in the market faci l i tated 
the dec i s ion to part ic ipate in SHAs and gain market and 
Organi zat ional dominant pos it ions . Alternatively, normat ive 
organi zational pressures were argued to hinder the process 
of part icipat ing in SRAs and gaining market and 
organi zational dominance . 
.ix 
An important f inding of this research was that high 
levels of SRA penetration had a negat ive influence on a l l  
three dependent variabl es , SRA part i c ipat ion ,  market 
dominance , and organizational dominance .  Thi s  finding 
suggest s  that as market consolidation advances , teaching 
hospitals may f ind i t  diff icult to parti c ipate in SRAs or 
gain positions of dominance .  In addit i on to the SRA 
penetration measure there were a number of other 
relationships of interest .  SRA part icipation was related to 
the percent of large employers in the market and the 
teaching hospital ' s  net revenue . Market dominance was 
related to the percent of large group practices and the 
percent of primary care phys icians in the market as wel l  as 
the profit status of the teaching hospital . Organi zational 
dominance was related to the profit status and the 
admini strat ive structure of the teaching hospital . 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduct ion 
Teaching hospitals are an important part of America ' s  
health care system . In addit ion to their sophi sticated 
technology and cutt ing edge research, they deliver a l arge 
percentage of health care services throughout the country 
(Igl ehart , 1993 ) . They also deliver a di sproport ionate share 
of charity and indigent care . Although only a small 
percentage of all short -term, non- f ederal acute care 
hospitals are classif ied as members of the Counci l  of 
Teaching Hospitals and Health Systems , they represent 
approximately one fourth of all the beds and admi ss ions 
across the country . However,  in recent years , teaching 
hospitals have faced decl ining support for indigent care , 
decreas ing demands for special ist phys icians , and increas ing 
cl inical competit ion in their local markets ( Luke & Bramb l e ,  
1 996 ; Moy , Valent e ,  Levin, Bhak , & Grine r ,  1996 ) . Increasing 
compet i t ion for pat ients among hospitals has become 
especially important in l ight of hospital consol idat ion into 
fewer organi zat ions and aggressive system to compete for 
managed care contracts ( Luke & Olden , 1 9 9 5 ) . Thus one goal 
of this study i s  to examine how increas ing competition 
1 
within their health care environments e f fect the nat ion ' s  
teaching hospital s . 
2 
Because of their organi zational structures and history 
of serving as a necessary public good, rather than one o f  
several competing private service providers , teaching 
hospitals face certain barriers as they attempt to respond 
to changes occurring in the health care industry . It has 
been noted that within consol idat ing market s ,  teaching 
hospitals may be inhibited in their attempt s  to make the 
rap i d  deci s ions necessary to ef fectively compete with other 
providers in the market (Rogers , Snyderman , & Rogers , 1994 ) . 
Thi s i s  in part due to the complex and inflexible structures 
that seem to be prevalent in most teaching hospitals ( Thier,  
1994 ) . Additionally, many of them operate within the 
pol i t ical arena and therefore face strict state requirements 
with respect to personnel and purchasing pol icies , 
constraints to acquire capital for investing in various 
partnering arrangement s ,  and other pol i t i cal interferences 
( Iglehart , 1995) . Al l of thi s handi caps the teaching 
hospital ' s  abi l ity to operate in market s  where new 
interdependencies between hospital s ,  physicians , and third 
party payers are being created . 
Many teaching hospitals face uncertain futures in the 
wake of development s that threaten the ir t radit i onal ways of 
doing business .  As market forces change the shape of 
America's health care system, teaching hospitals risk losing 
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the ir central role of providing valued complex and 
speciali zed services and becoming solely hospitals of last 
resort for the indigent and poor . For example , it has been 
noted that in many urban areas , teaching hospitals offer few 
servi ces that are not available in other community hospitals 
or from physician spec ialists in private pract ice (Howard , 
1 9 94 ; Kralewski , Hart , Perlmutter, & Chou , 1 9 9 5 ) . Teaching 
hospitals must adapt the tradit ions of academic medicine to 
the new strategic choices and business challenges that are 
emerging . Thus , in a managed care environment , teaching 
hospi tals may need to establish partnerships and other 
contractual arrangements with area health care providers to 
maintain reasonable pat ient flows and referrals of tertiary 
cases for teaching and research . 
The strategic chal lenges fac ing teaching hospit a l s  are 
daunt ing . It is l ikely that their responses wi l l  vary from 
one teaching hospital to the next , in part , due to 
di f ferences in market and organizat ional structures . 
This study focuses on the impact of changes in the 
hea l th care market on the nation ' s  teaching hospital s .  
Several questions are asked : 
1 .  What organizat ional and market characterist ics are 
associated with teaching hospital part i c ipat ion in 
hospital networks? 
2. What organi zational and market characteri stics are 
assoc iated with the strategic positions that teaching 
hospitals have within their local markets and, i f  
relevant , the ir hospital networks? 
3 .  What organizat ional and market characteristics are 
associated with the organi zat ional pos it ions of teaching 
hospi tals within the ir hospital networks ?  
4 
To provide a context for this study, this research devel ops 
the importance of the nation ' s  teaching hospitals and 
di scuses the changes occurring across the health care 
industry . A theoretical framework and typology are devel oped 
for the purpose of clari fying the relat ionships that exi s t  
between teaching hospitals and thei r  organi zat ional and 
market pos itions in their local environments . Focus ing on 
these relationships , a set of hypotheses are derived and 
analyzed . Finally,  the resul t s  are presented and 
imp l ications and suggestions for further research are 
discus sed . 
Teaching Hospi tals 
Defining Teaching Hospitals 
For the purpose of this research , a designation 
cons i s tent with that of the As sociat ion of American Medical 
Col leges ' Counc i l  of Teaching Hospitals i s  used to broadly 
define Ameri ca ' s  teaching hospital s .  Many hospitals 
demonstrate a commitment to the three mi ssions of teaching 
hospital s ; namely, medical education ,  c l inical research, and 
5 
pat ient care , especially care of the poor and indigent 
( Ebert & Brown , 19B3 ) . But they di f fer in the degree to 
which they are involved in each of these mi ss ions . To de f ine 
teaching hospital s ,  one must di f ferentiate between hospi tals 
tha� have a maj or commi tment to these mi ss ions from those 
that do not . To do thi s ,  this research applies the current 
requi rements of the As sociat ion of Ameri can Medi cal Col l eges 
(AAMC ) for membership in the Counci l  of Teaching Hospit a l s  
and Health Systems ( COTH) . 
Current ly a member of COTH must , at a minimum, sponsor 
four approved res idency programs . Two of these must include 
medic ine , surgery, pediatrics , fami l y  practice,  
obstetrics /gynecology , or psychiatry . They must also have a 
documented affil iation agreement with a medical school 
(Associat ion of Ameri can Medical Col leges , 1 995 ) . 
Using the COTH def inition allows us to dist inguish 
between maj or teaching and non-teaching hospital s .  
Addi t ionally,  this de f init ion ident ifies teaching hospitals 
according to their degree of commitment to academic 
medic ine . Such dist inctions have proven use ful in 
ident i f ying teaching and non- teaching hospitals over several 
decades ( Lash & Dickler , 1993 ) . Throughout the remainder of 
this study , hospitals that meet the above def init ions are 
referred to as COTHs or teaching hospitals interchangeably .  
Al l other hospitals are referred to as communi ty hospital s . 
6 
Organizat ional Structure of Teaching Hospi tals 
There are a number of issues to consider when viewing 
the organi zational structure of teaching hospital s . Some of 
these include whether the teaching hospital is publ ic or 
private and the degree to which the hospital is t ied to the 
medical school and universi t y .  This sect ion looks at both of 
these i ssue s ,  discussing the latter fi rst . 
For those hospitals that meet the broad def init ion o f  a 
COTH , the AAMC ident i f ies three subgroups :  integrated 
hospital s ;  independent hospitals ; and children's , specialty,  
or Veteran Af fairs hospitals (Assoc iation of American 
Medi cal Col lege s ,  1 9 9 5 ) . Only the f irst two subgroups , 
integrated hospitals and independent hospitals are used in 
this study ( see Appendix 1 & 2 for a list of hospitals in 
these groups ) .  Integrated COTHs are made up of general , non­
federal , acute care hospitals that are under common 
ownership with an accredited col lege of medicine or have the 
medical school's chairmen ei ther serving as or appoint ing 
the hospital chiefs of service . Independent COTHs do not 
have common ownership , but have signed a f f i l iations with 
accredited medical schools that fall short of common 
ownership . However,  they do sponsor or signi ficant l y  
part ic ipate , a s  defined b y  the criteria for COTH membership , 
in graduate medical educat ion . Both integrated and 
independent COTHs can either have private or public 
ownership . 
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Many teaching hospitals often must deal with mul t iple 
owners or owner- l ike groups who wish to inf luence operating 
dec i s ions (Munson , Choi , & Al lison , 1 9 8 6 ) . This is 
part i cularly evident in state university and publicly owned 
teaching hospital s .  For example , much of the complex, 
regulated and inf lexible organizat ional structures of 
teaching hospitals has evolved and is perpetuated from the 
role society expects them to play . Thus , COTHs may feel the 
influence of many different interest groups trying to ensure 
their needs are met .  
Adding to the complexity of integrated COTHs are the i r  
governance structures . Traditional ly there is a board of 
regents that oversees and governs both the academic and 
hospital units of the university ( Choi , Al l i son , & Munson , 
1 9 8 5 ) . This dual respons ibi l i t y  decreases the l ikel i hood of 
t imely responses to competit ion by other providers . 
Additional l y ,  having to f irst receive state and/or 
university approval for the many critical as wel l  as rout ine 
dec i s ions that have to made further slows the respons ivenes s  
to competit ive market changes ( Choi , Al l i son , & Munson , 
1 9 8 5 ) . Thi s  produces a cumbersome process that resul t s  in 
the loss of opportunities to strengthen , i f  not maintain,  
the teaching hospital ' s  market position (Munson , Choi , & 
Al l i son , 1 9 8 6 ) . 
The degree of interference to the decision-making 
processes may be related to the ownership of the teaching 
hospi tal . Al l ison and Dalston ( 1 982 ) point out several 
imp l i cations related to teaching hospital ownership . They 
reported that private teaching hospi tal s typically are 
l arger and have larger budget s  than do the ir univers ities . 
Thi s  creates a s ituation where the influence of private 
teaching hospitals over their universities is greater than 
that which public teaching hospitals have over their 
universi t ies . For example , whi le private COTHs rely on 
pati ent care revenue and phil antrophy, public COTHs receive 
state appropriat ions (Al l ison & Dal ston ,  1 9 8 2 ; Choi , 
Al l i son , & Munson , 1 9 8 5 ) . Moreover ,  this appropriat ion 
rarely goes to the hospitals directly,  but is al located to 
the univers ities , which then al locate funds to the hospital 
or i t s  various units ; thus , greater power and influence is 
given to the states and universities . 
Characteri stics of Teaching Hospitals 
8 
Teaching hospitals evolved in the early twent ieth 
century in response to changes in both medi cal educat ion and 
the perceived needs for speciali zed care ( Flexner, 1 9 1 0 ;  
Ebert & Brown , 1 9 8 3 ; Igl ehart , 1 9 9 3 ) . The act ivities of 
teaching hospitals go far beyond those of other acute care 
general hospitals . Both COTHs and community hospitals are 
concerned with applying existing knowledge in the pursuit of 
pat ient care . However ,  COTHs have additional concerns , 
including responsibility for developing and assessing new 
technol ogies and drugs , educating and training society ' s  
phys i cians , and caring for the poorest and s i ckest of 
pat ients ( Kassirer , 1 9 92 ) . 
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Teaching hospitals are , in general , large fac i l i ties 
that have longer lengths of stays , higher expenses per 
admi ssion , greater numbers of servi ces , and more ful l - t ime 
equivalents per pat ient than non- teaching hospital s ( see 
Table 1 ) . They tend to be located within large urban market s  
with the l arger metropolitan areas having b e  more than one 
COTH . Addit iona l l y ,  many are l ocated in the inner cites and 
are thus pl agued by the problems associated with these 
areas , such as violence and poverty ( Iglehart , 1 9 93 ) . As 
noted in Table 1 ,  many of these COTHs are l ocated in the 
l arge eastern markets . Table 1 also shows that both 
integrated and independent COTHs represent approximatel y  1 0 %  
of the general acute care hospitals and together they 
account for about 2 5% of hospital admiss ions . Thus , they are 
s igni f i cant providers of patient care . Furthermore , the 
table shows that the costs of providing pat ient care are 
general ly higher for COTHs than community hospitals 
( Epstein,  1995; Igl ehart , 1 9 93 ) . 
Many reasons for the di f ferences noted above exist . A 
summary of some of these di f ferences is shown in Table 2 .  In 
addi tion, teaching hospitals must cover much of the cost s 
through patient care revenues ,  treat a higher pat ient mix 
( i . e . , a greater number of complex cases ) , make heavier use 
of l aboratory and other high priced technologies associated 
with teaching , and see a greater number of non-paying 
pat ient s ( Ebert & Brown , 1 9 8 3 ) . 
1 0  
Much o f  the higher costs associated with COTHs may be 
att ributed to their stance towards the use of new, and 
somet ime s t i l l  experimental , procedures . Teaching hospi tals 
develop and test many new technologies and whi le these may 
be expensive and only marginally useful , especially in the 
short - term, their use may be essent ial to the academic 
advancement of COTH faculty members ( Fox & Wasserman , 1 9 9 3 )  
Thus , incentives exist not only t o  have available but a l so 
to use all available technologies . 
. 1 1 
Table 1 
Number of Inpat ient Services and Geographical Distribution 
of COTHs and Community Hospitals 
Integrated Independent Communi t y  
COTHs COTHs Hospi tal s 
Number of hospitals 1 1 3  1 7 5  2 , 4 4 6  
Percentage of total 4 . 1  6 . 4  8 9 . 5  
Beds 
Total 7 1 , 0 8 3  9 5 , 0 9 5  5 5 4 , 0 1.5 
Average 6 2 9  5 4 3  2 2 6  
Percentage of total 1 0 . 0  1 3 . ° 7 7 . 0  
Admi s sions 
Total 2 , 5 6 7 , 684 3 , 6 0 6 , 7 0 1  1 8 , 9 0 0 , 6.08 
Average 2 2 , 7 2 3  2 0 , 6 0 9  7 , 72 7  
Percentage of total 1 0 . 0  1 5 . 0  7 5 . 0  
No . inpatients surgeries 9 9 1 , 64 9  1 , 124 , 3 04 7 , 4 6 1 , 5 7 2  
Percentage o f  total 1 0 . 4  1 1 .  7 7 7 . 9  
Average l ength of stay 7 . 4 6  7 . 0 3 6 . 0 8 
Average no . of services 6 1  5 7  3 9  
Region 
East 3 8  82  524 
South 3 3  2 7  8 1 3  
Midwest 2 8  4 6  5 6 7  
West 14 2 0  5 4 2  
Notes . Source 1994  AHA Annual Survey Data 
1 2  
Table 2 
Summary of the Differences between COTH Members and 
Community Hospitals 
COTHs 
• pevelop and assess new 
technology 
• Appl y  innovat ive and 
experimental treatments 
• Heavy use of specialists 
• Emphas is on tertiary care 
• Heavy use of inpatient 
care 
• Extra costs due to 
resident pat ient care 
( i . e .  t raining) 
• Autonomous faculty 
pract ice plans 
Community Hospitals 
• Prudent use of existing 
technology 
• Apply exi st ing knowl edge 
( i . e . , practice guidelines ) 
• Heavy use of primary care 
physicians 
• Emphasis on primary care 
• Heavy use outpatient care 
• E f f icient pat ient care 
through the coordinated 
use of various health care 
professional s  
• Coordinated phys ician 
prac t i ces 
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Teaching hospital s ,  in connect ion with medical school s  
also have a large commitment t o  research . Their research has 
led to dramatic advances in many areas such as gene therapy,  
immunology, and organ t ransplantation (Levey, 1 9 95) . Funding 
for much of this research comes from the Nat ional Insti tutes 
of Health (NIH) and the pharmaceut ical and biotechnical 
industries (Ebert & Brown , 1 9 8 3 ;  Levey,  1 9 9 5 ) . 
A number of federal and state policies have impacted 
COTHs throughout the years . For example ,  Medicare and 
Medi caid have allowed hospitals to receive at least some 
reimbursement for care provided to previous ly designated 
charity pat ient s ( Schramm, 1 9 8 3 ) . Thi s  has provided 
addit ional funds to teaching hospital s ,  making a pos it ive 
d i f ference in their f inancial viabi l i t y  ( Ebert & Brown , 
1 9 8 3 )  . 
Industry Changes in the Health Care Environment 
Despite the fact that public and pol itical pres sure for 
nat ional health care re form has at least temporari l y  
disappeared, the motivation f o r  health care organizat ions to 
pos i t i on themselves to survive within a continually changing 
market has not . Increases in public awarenes s  and the threat 
of government reform have set in motion a f renzy of 
consol idat ion activity and other market responses including 
outright mergers , vert ical integrat ion ,  and the format ion o f  
l oose a l l iances between health care organi zat ions . 
Consolidat ion has occurred at all levels of health care , 
including payer as wel l  as provider organizations (Luke , 
Rossiter , Swisher , & Bramble , 1.9 9 6 ; Zelman, 1.9 9 6 ) .  
1.4 
The changing markets in health care can be seen in 
conceptual terms . The key actors can be grouped according to 
whether they are customers , suppliers , or compet ing f i rms , 
a l l  of which interact with one another (Di l l , 1.95 8 ;  Emery & 
Trist , 1.965,  Pfeffer & Salancik ,  1.97 8 ;  Starkweather & Cook , 
1.9 8 8 ) . From a hospital ' s  strategic viewpoint , the maj or 
riva l s  with which hospital s compete for customers and other 
crit ical resources are l ocated mainly within their own 
market areas ( Thore l l i , 1.9 8 6 ) . The argument i s  often made 
that " health care is local " and thus should be examined at 
the l ocal level ( Luft et al . ,  1.9 86 ; Luke , 1. 991.) . 
Changes among health care providers produce 
countervail ing responses among others within their 
respect ive markets , which in turn may st imulate further 
changes adding turbulence and uncertainty to the health care 
envi ronment . In Denver,  for example , a series of 
acquisit ions and all iances has resulted in a l l  1.5 acute care 
general hospitals becoming al igned with other hospitals in 
four l ocal heal th care systems or networks . Denver is not 
atypical of market s  nationally where s imi lar changes are 
occurring among hospital s ,  phys ician groups , and managed 
care organi zat ions . 
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Among hospitals , one o f  the more important 
organizational forms to emerge in the local market s  are 
strategical ly al igned hospital clusters . In a recent study , 
Luke and Olden ( 1 9 9 5 )  found that within urban market.s 
approximately 55% of community acute care general hospitals 
part icipated in local systems and networks . Luke , Olden and 
Bramble ( 1 9 9 7 )  labeled these local systems and networks as 
strategic hospital al l i ances ( SHAs ) , which are defined as : 
two or more hospitals in a given market that come 
together to generate critical competitive advantages 
and pursue their collective survival in the market. 
Many SHAs thus represent loose a f f i l iat ions among 
col l aborating hospital s . Even many that j oin hospital s 
strategical ly through ownership leave in place preexisting 
management and governance structures resulting in high 
leve l s  of interorgani zational autonomy among local 
col l aborators . Thus the format ion of SHAs at the l ocal l evel 
represents a signi ficant change from the organi zat ional 
hierarchies that typical ly are discussed in the literature 
(As t l ey & Brahm, 1 9 8 9 ) . 
Many environmental forces may influence hospitals as 
they decide to participate in SHAs ; however,  as suggested by 
Luke and Olden ( 1 9 9 5 ) , the need to compete in the growing 
managed care environment may provide the primary rat ionale 
for much of the recent interorgani zat ional activity among 
hospi tal s .  
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Viewed as viable mechanisms for containing the rapidly 
rising costs of health care , managed care plans have 
proliferated in the last few years as more and more 
employers and other payers have sought to control thei r  
health care costs . These plans have integrated the financing 
and del ivery of care through contracts with hospitals and 
other providers to provide service s ,  capitated payment 
arrangements with employers that agree to purchase servi ces 
only through the plan, and the management of uti l i zat ion 
among plan members and part icipat ing providers . In return 
for assurances of pat ient flows , hospitals and other 
providers have agreed to perform selected covered services 
for predetermined ,  often discounted prices . 
Overall , managed care penetration of local health care 
market s  has increased rapidly in recent years ( InterStudy, 
1 9 9 6 ) . As managed care companies have entered market s  and 
gained control over increased numbers of c l ient s ,  hosp i t a l s  
have found themselves more dependent on managed care 
contrac t s  for a steady flow of pat ient s and revenues .  Being 
abl e  to secure contract s  with managed care plans has become 
a primary strategic concern for hospital s . Thus , the threat 
of managed care penetration in the market , whether real or 
perceived , is assumed to be an important force driving 
hospitals to j oin together to gain power and improve the i r  
abi l i t y  to negot iate and obtain managed care contracts . I n  
market s  where there are large numbers of hospitals or, 
possibly more important l y ,  act ive SHAs , the threat of not 
obta ining managed care contracts is ampl i f ied . 
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In addition to rival hospitals and local systems and 
networks compet ing for managed care contracts , there are 
other important threats in the markets . For example , to the 
extent that primary care and mUl t i - specialty phys icians 
become viable partners for managed care companies , they 
serve as competit ive threats to hospital s .  Also , large 
bus inesses or bus iness coal itions , to the extent they 
represent large numbers of employees and dependent s ,  can 
have s igni f i cant market power and negotiat ing presence in 
managed care contract ing . 
In sum , teaching hospitals operate in environment s 
where hospitals are responding to growing managed care 
penetration and other factors by rapidly consolidating , 
result ing in fewer organi zat ional ent ities within individual 
market s  that compete for pat ient s . How COTHs respond to this 
environment i s  signi f icant as it may directly determine 
the i r  ability to survive and thrive as an essent ial producer 
of health servi ces , research , and medical education . 
COTHs and a Changing Health Care Environment 
Although its been said that America ' s  teaching 
hospitals are the envy of the world ( Kassirer , 1 9 94 ) , they 
are not shielded from the environmental pressures j us t  
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discussed . Furthermore , their envious status does not assure 
their ult imate survival . If COTHs fail to respond to the 
environmental changes ,  their fate may be analogous to that 
of the rai l road industry . As Goldman ( 1 9 9 5 )  pointed out , 
rai l roads once dominated industrial America,  but lost their 
central role as technology and consumer tastes chang,ed . Thi s 
occurred because the rail road industry failed to pos it ion 
itself to take advantage of rapid changes in modes of 
transportation . Thus , the trucking and airl ine industries 
increasingly dominated freight and passenger transportat ion . 
The rai l road industry did dot dissolve , but stagnated and 
l ost its importance as technological and other changes 
s igni f icantl y  altered the transportat ion bus iness . A s imilar 
fate may await America ' s  teaching hospital s ,  as a 
consequence of the rapid changes occurring in the health 
care industry . 
The hospital sector that was once based on solo 
hospitals compet ing with one another ( Starr , 1 9 8 2 )  is 
quickly becoming a sector dominated by highly compet i t ive 
hospital systems and networks . These and other market 
pres sures threaten the central role of teaching hospitals 
(Blumenthal & Meyer , 1 9 9 3 ; Goldman , 1 9 9 5 ; Kassirer , 1 9 9 4 ; & 
Levey , 1 9 9 5 ) . Whi l e  COTHs may have thought themselves 
impervious to these market changes , it has become 
increasingly c lear that they must adapt or risk being 
great l y  dimini shed as health care players ( Iglehart , 1 9 9 4 )  
I t  has been suggested that the importance COTHs place on 
training specialists over generalists , adopting the latest 
and most expensive technologie s ,  and cult ivating their 
tert i ary and quaternary care versus primary care is in 
direct opposition to the direction in whi ch health care 
reform and market restructuring i s  headed (Anderson , 
Steinberg, & Heyssel , 1 9 94 ) . 
1 9  
Teaching hospital s must f ind ways t o  continue their 
threefold mi ssion ( i . e . , patient care , c l inical research , 
and medical educat ion) in a price sens it ive market (Howard , 
1 9 94 ) . Whi le educat ion and research are the primary concerns 
of the medical schoo l s ,  pat ient care is the primary mi s s ion 
of the teaching hospitals (Heyssel , 1 9 8 4 ; Lash & Dickl e r ,  
1 9 93 ) . However, their mi ss ion of pat ient care is i n  
j eopardy . A number of other providers are threatening to 
take market share away from teaching hospitals by offering 
lower prices and easier access through new and dif ferent 
points of sale (Heyssel , 1 9 8 4 ; Hurl ey & Thompson , 1 9 93 ) . 
Teaching hospital s must compete against the other hospitals 
in their local market for managed care contract s .  However ,  
according t o  Kassirer ( 1 9 94 ) , i t  i s  the extra costs 
assoc iated with teaching and training phys icians that result 
in teaching hospitals cost ing 3 0 %  to 4 0 %  more than non­
teaching hospital s .  Because of the extra expense of these 
addi t ional responsibi l it ies , COTHs have a di f f i cul t t ime 
compet ing on a price bas is with other community hospitals 
(Howard , 1994 ; Munson , Choi , & Al l i son , 1 9 8 6 ) . 
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Teaching hospitals often have very large physic ian 
groups assoc iated with them. Some of the diff iculty of 
compet ing for managed care contracts may be magni f ied due to 
problems associated with these physician groups , commonl y 
referred to as facul ty pract i ce plans . Many faculty plans 
are organi zed by department s and then by sub- specialty with 
each operat ing independent ly ( Fox & Was serman , 1 9 93 ) . 
According to Fox and Wasserman , this puts COTHs and their 
facul ty at a disadvantage in compet ing for comprehensive 
contracts from managed care organizations seeking 
coordinated services . 
As managed care penetration and competition continues 
to increase , COTHs may find themselves being used less and 
less by managed care organizat ions (All i son & Dalston, 
1 9 8 2 ) . Thi s wi l l  result in fewer admi ss ions and procedures ,  
as wel l  as fewer referrals to hospital -based special ists . A 
shrinking patient and revenue base that results in a 
reduct ion in physician reimbursement may drive medical 
f aculty out of teaching hospitals ( Goldman , 1 9 9 5 ; Wei l and , 
Malone , Bay, & Garren, 1 9 9 5 ) . The erosion of the teaching 
hospi tal s '  faculty could negat ively impact the qua l i t y  of 
medical education . 
An additional concern for COTHs , as managed care 
organi zat ions control a greater number of patient s ,  is a 
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real threat o f  financial insolvency (Rogers , Snyderman, & 
Rogers , 1 9 94 ) . As market forces continue to move in the 
direction of control l ing costs and price competit ion, the 
abi l ity of COTHs to cross - subsidize their education and 
research mi ssions will decrease (Anderson , Steinberg , & 
Heyssel , 1 9 94 ) . Anderson and others point out that the 
funding of medical educat ion is heavily dependent on the 
revenues from pat ient care ; thus , anything that effects 
those revenues directly ef fects the financial abi l i ty of 
COTHs to perform their other functions . Teaching hospitals 
use revenue from pat ient services to cross - subsidi ze both 
the medical school ' s  educat ion and cl inical research 
(Anderson , Steinberg , & Heyssel , 1 9 94 ; Iglehart , 1 9 93 ) . Thi s  
was made possible because third party payers were wil l ing t o  
pay the higher prices assoc iated with patient services 
provided by COTHs (Anderson , Steinberg , & Heys sel , 1 9 94 ; 
Iglehart , 1 9 93 ) . To compete , COTHs wi l l  have to improve 
e f f i c iencies and , in part icular , control admi ssions and 
l engths of stay . 
Teaching hospitals also face the continual threat of 
decreases in the current l evel of indirect medical education 
( IME ) payments they receive . For example , in one recent 
health care reform proposal , it was proposed to cut Medicare 
IME adj ustments from 7 . 7 % to 3% by 1 9 9 7  ( Japsen , 1 9 94 ) . 
Japsen reported that for one teaching hospital , the 
University of Minnesota Health System this change would 
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result in a loss of approximately $4 mi l l ion and other COTHs 
may lose more. 
S igni ficance of the Study 
Despite the fai lure of health care re form in the early 
1 9 9 0 s ,  there has continued to be a profound shi ft in the 
purchas ing , financing , and del ivery of health care . Managed 
care companies and other third party payers concerned with 
escalat ing costs are increas ingly channel ing patient s to 
selected network partners , integrated del ivery systems , or 
other provider groupings that are capable of managing the 
care and costs of the health services they provide to 
def ined populat ions . In response , numerous relationships 
between hospitals and other health care providers are 
forming in order for them to compete for pat ient s . Thi s  
market evolut ion , though a t  various stages across market s  
(Nauert , 1 9 9 5 ) , is occurring throughout the country and 
COTHs are unable to escape the pressure to reorganize and 
s trategi cally al ign with other providers . 
Teaching hospital s are an important part of Ameri ca ' s  
health care system . As previously discussed, in addit ion to 
the ir sophist icated technology and cutt ing edge research , 
they del iver a large percentage of health care service in 
the United States . As the training grounds for future 
phys i c i ans , centers for research , and maj or providers o f  
health care servi ces , underst anding how organizat ional and 
market factors impact ing COTHs is of great signi f i cance . 
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Fac ing erosion o f  their pat ient base , COTHs have begun 
to explore ways to compete against forming and estab l ished 
integrated systems . Creating mul t i - organizat ional integrated 
systems can take several shapes .  To compete in the future 
and maintain their threefold mi ssion , COTHs will need to 
restructure their institut ions . They need to lower cos t s , 
assume risk, f ind new locat ions for training physicians with 
an emphas i s  on primary care , and be properly al igned to 
assure access to managed care contracts (Hagland , 1 9 9 6 ; 
Nauret , 1 9 9 5 ; & Snyderman , 1 9 9 7 ) . 
Teaching hospitals are currently either j oining some 
type of provider network, building their own networks , or 
approaching the market s  in other ways ( Iglehart , 1 9 9 5 ) . 
COTHs not considering any of these opt i ons may possibly be 
suffering from paralysi s  and plac ing their fates in the 
hands of others . 
Thi s  research sets out to advance our understanding o f  
how COTHs relate to their local environment s .  In the next 
chapte r ,  it is argued that COTHs are influenced by a variety 
of environmental and institutional forces . Both of these 
forces are expected to influence the structural 
characteristics and abi l ity of teaching hospitals to change 
or adapt to their envi ronment s .  Ins ights gained by s tudying 
the market behaviors of COTHs should be of value to both 
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pol icy makers and hospital execut ives a s  they guide teaching 
hospitals through the turbulent health care environment . 
CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical Foundat ion 
Hospitals- like other organizat ions are af fected by the 
environments in which they operate . In the 1 9 8 0 s  and through 
the beginning of the 1 9 9 0 s  the overal l  health care 
environment experienced an increase in pol itical and publ i c  
pressure to contain cost , cover the uninsured , and improve 
the quality of the care provided (Blumenthal & Meyer,  1 9 9 3 ; 
Howard , 1 9 9 4 ) . These pressures created a great deal of 
uncertainty and turbulence as providers attempted to conform 
to and meet these requirement s .  
Since the beginning of the 1 9 9 0 s  two phenomena occurred 
that increased the market pressure felt by COTHs ( Lash & 
Dickler, 1 9 9 3 ; Pal l arito , 1 9 9 5 ) as wel l  as by other 
community hospitals (Gilles , Shortell , Anderson , & Morgan , 
1 9 9 5 ) . Both the threat of maj or governmental health care 
reform and increases in managed care penetration across the 
nat ion together have st imulated hospitals to combine into 
various forms of interorgani zational relat ionships' . Despite 
the collapse of governmental health care reform, increases 
'Thi s  conclusion i s  based upon a careful reading of the 
popul ar health care li terature ( e . g . , see Scott , 1 9 9 5 )  and 
numerous phone interviews . 
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i n  managed care penetration has continued and the surge of 
hospi tal mergers and network format ions did not slow ( Lut z ,  
1 9 9 5 ) . Growth in managed care continues t o  be a force to 
which hospitals must adapt (Nevi l l e ,  1 9 9 5 ; Pal larito , 1 9 9 5 )  
A s  noted i n  Chapter 1 ,  hospitals have responded to 
environmental threats by j oining together at the local l evel 
(Luke , Ozcan, & Begun , 1 9 9 0 ) , despite a hi story of working 
independent ly and resist ing collaborat ion ( Starr , 1 9 82 ) . The 
dynamic growth of hospitals working together in both formal 
and less formal arrangements changed a once cottage industry 
populated by thousands of individual , freestanding , and 
l argely not - for -profit hospitals to a " crazy" qui l t  of 
systems , all iances , and networks ( Shortel l ,  1 9 8 8 , p .  1 7 7 )  
Increasingly, hospitals found themselves operating wi thin an 
interdependent health care environment consisting of 
mul t iple interorganizational rel at ionships . 
Chapter 1 also argued that teaching hospitals are a 
maj or part of our country ' s  health system, with their 
abi l i ty to provide pat ient care , research, and training for 
future phys icians . Thus , we must attempt to better 
understand their pos it ion and strategic response to the 
ever- changing health care envi ronment . Thi s chapter examines 
some of the theoret ical and conceptual issues surrounding 
the response of both COTHs and community hospitals to their 
changing environments by creat ing not only 
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interorgani zat ional ,  but also , more speci fically, integrated 
relat ionships . 
Organi zat ions and Institutional Environments 
Among several organi zat ional perspect ives , one in 
particular- - insti tutional theory- - is wel l  suited for the 
studying uniqueness of teaching hospital s .  This perspective 
emphas i zes that organizat ions operate in open systems 
( Scot t ,  1 9 9 2 ) and, thus , are strongly influenced by their 
external environment s .  Organi zat ional choice and action ,  
within this perspect ive , i s  seen t o  b e  l imited by a variety 
of external pressures (Meyer,  Scot t ,  & Deal , 1 8 8 3 ) to which 
organi zat ions must respond in order to survive (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1 9 7 7 ) . A main concern is that organizat ions respond 
adequately to the environment ' s  expectat ions of them ( Mohr , 
1 9 92 ) . Thus , organizat ions attempt to mirror environmental 
expectations regardless of whether or not they beli�ve the 
prescribed practice wi l l  actually work within their own 
organizat ions (DiMaggio & Powel l ,  1 9 8 3 ) . Such a compul s ive 
need to conform to rules , regulations , and the norms of 
others helps the organi zations to attain their goals and 
obj ect ives . More important ly, it helps them increase or 
assure their l egit imacy, thus , increas ing their chances not 
only for success ,  but also for survival ( Galaskiewic z  & 
Wasserman , 1 9 8 9 ) . 
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The institutional perspective further suggests that the 
envi ronment constrains organi zations either technically or 
inst itutionally (Meyer & Scott , 1 9 8 3 ) . Technical constraints 
relate to markets in which products or services are 
exchanged . In technical environments organizat ions are 
required to manage , control , and coordinate effectively 
their work processes , whi le buffering those processes from 
disturbances in the environment . In this type of 
environment , organi zations are primarily concerned with 
achieving appropriate outcomes . 
Alternatively, organizations that are within 
inst itutional environments are preoccupied with ensuring 
correct and appropriate structures and processes to pursue 
the i r  goals and obj ect ives (Alexander & D ' Aunno , 1 9 9 4 ; 
Alexander & Scott , 1 9 8 4 ; Meyer & Rowan , 1 9 7 7 ) . Inst i tut ional 
constraints consist of elaborate rules and regulat ions to 
which organi zat ions must conform if they want to receive 
support and attain legit imacy (DiMaggio & Powel l ,  1 9 8 3 ; 
Fennel l ,  1 9 8 0 ; Zucker,  1 9 8 3 ) . From an institutional 
perspect ive , legit imacy is a condit ion that reflects support 
for the organizat ion as wel l  as conformity to relevant rul e s  
or l aws ( S cott , 1 9 9 5 ) . It  ref lects the degree of support a n  
organi zat ion receives from significant others , both 
pol i t i cal and cultural (Meyer & Scot t ,  1 9 83 ) . In changing 
environments ,  it may be the case that organi zat ions are 
confronted by many and sometimes conf l i ct ing authority 
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f igures o r  entities ( i . e . , signi f icant individuals or 
organi z ations in the market ) .  Organizat ions facing this 
s i tuat ion may f ind it di f f icult to act because of such 
conf l i c t ing demands (Meyer & Scott , 1 9 8 3 ) . Conformity to one 
set of demands is easily done at the peril of not responding 
to the important . demands of others , and thereby los ing the ir 
support . 
Al l organizations face , to some degree , both technical 
and institutional environments (Al exander & Scott , 1 9 8 4 ) . 
However,  hospital organizations find themselves in unique , 
often conflict ing s ituat ions of operating in environment s 
where both technical and institutional component s have 
st rong influences on them . Health care i s  one of the most 
regulated industries within the United States economy . 
Providers face considerable technical constraints 
( Scot t , 1 9 92 ) . The many innovat ions in medical treatments 
and the emphasis on cost control as wel l  as effic iency a l l  
increase technical pressures experienced by hospital 
organi zations ( Fennel l  & Alexander ,  1 9 8 7 ) . Alternatively,  
hosp i t a l s  face inst itutional pressures from a number of 
sources that include not only the state and health care 
professions , but interest groups , publ ic opinion, even , 
managed care organi zations ( Scott , 1 9 8 7 ) . This duality of 
technical and institutional pressures can produce 
s igni f i cant confl icts for hospitals (Alexander & D ' Aunno , 
1 9 9 0 ) , especially for teaching hospitals that face strong 
ins t i tutional constraints .  
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I f  applied t o  hospital s ,  institut ional theory would 
suggest that to survive hospitals would need to conform and 
adhere to the external rules and norms of both technical and 
insti tut ional environments (DiMaggio & Powel l , 1 9 8 3 ; Meyer & 
Rowan , 1 9 7 7 ) . Thus , if it is the environmentally accepted 
view that hospitals must j oin networks rather than to 
operate independently to contain cost s ,  be more efficient , 
and provide quality care , then hospital s wi l l  l ikely seek 
and develop relationships with one another . 
The concept that captures this phenomenon is that of 
i somorphism .  I somorphism represents a constraining process 
in which organi zat ions are pressured to resemble others 
within populations of organizat ions facing similar 
environmental threat s .  Three types of isomorphi sm have been 
ident i f ied . They are coercive , normat ive , and mimetic 
( DiMaggio & Powell , 1 9 8 3 ) . All of them can be seen to 
influence organi zations to change in order to become more 
l ike others in the ir environment s  and to increase their 
perce ived legit imacy and chances for survival . 
Coercive isomorphism occurs when external pressures 
from one or more organizat ions begin increas ingly to shape 
and change other organi zat ions in the environment . 
Organizat ions can influence others to adopt certain 
pract ices through the exercise of authority or by induc ing 
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them using rewards and other incentives ( Scott , 1 9 8 7 ) . A 
study by DiMaggio ( 1 983 ) provides an example of how 
organi zat ions can be influenced by others to adopt certain 
structures . In this study, he showed that the central i zat ion 
of funding sources by the National Endowment of the Art s 
created an environment in which interact ions between those 
organizat ions in the art field increased . As these 
organizations positioned themselves to compete for the same 
resources ,  isomorphic forces , including coercive pressures , 
resulted in their developing similar internal organizat ional 
structures . 
In health care , critical resources are being contro l l ed 
and to some degree central i zed by managed care 
organi zat ions . As managed care organi zat ions increase the i r  
market presence , COTHs and others become more and more 
dependent on them for resources , especially cont racts for 
providing pat ient care to their enrol l ees . Managed care 
plans may opt not to support COTHs , unless they are part of 
l arger networks that have greater geographic coverage than 
would be available for COTHs standing alone and , appear to 
be more capable of providing efficient and ef fect ive pat ient 
care . This could resul t in COTHs being coerced into forming 
organi zat ional al ignments that they may not otherwi se have 
been will ing to considered . Other market pressures emanating 
from l arge businesses , business coal i t ions , large phys i c i an 
groups , and rival hospitals and strategic hospital a l l i ances 
are l ikely to contribute to the coercive pressures COTHs 
feel as they consider their response to the changing 
markets . 
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A second type of isomorphism- - normative - - represents the 
norms of professionalism as wel l  as the industry that are 
brought to bear upon organi zat ions . Normat ive pressures 
emphas ize rules that introduce a prescript ive and obl igatory 
dimension into organizat ions ( Scott , 1 9 95 ) . Thus , normat ive 
pressures influence how organi zations are to run . In one 
study, evidence was found that schools became more s imil ar 
over time (Meyer,  Scott , Strang , & Creighton , 1 9 8 8 ) . The 
authors argued that many of the changes were a result of 
changes in the framework of school policies that hold 
classrooms in place . They pointed out that classrooms around 
the country are held together by normative pressures such as 
the organizational roles , pol icies , and procedures that 
dominate the educat ional culture . According to Scott 
( 1 9 9 5 ) , norms define not only the goals and obj ect ives of an 
organi zation,  but how they are to be accomplished . 
Professional norms include normat ive pressures brought 
about by accredit ing bodies such as the Joint Commiss ion on 
Accredi tat ion of Healthcare Organi zat ions ( JCAHO) . More 
spec i f ically,  however,  there are organi zat ional norms unique 
to COTH hospital s .  Teaching hospitals must conform to the 
rul e s  that certi fying organizat ions require for res idency 
programs . Where COTHs are al igned with universities or state 
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governments , normative pressures may come i n  the form of 
bureaucrac ies that regulate and control the structuring and 
conduct of admini strat ive activities ( i . e . , pol icies and 
procedure s ) . Furthermore , COTHs have normative pressures 
that arise from their rol e  of hospitals of last resort which 
society and other community hospitals expect of them . 
Regardless of the sources of normat ive pressures , COTHs as a 
resul t ,  have " devel oped organi zat ional structures that may 
make rapid responses to market changes di fficul t . 
The third type of isomorphi sm- -mimetic - - occurs when 
organizations attempt to change in order to model themse lves 
after others in the market because they are unsure of what 
to do . They do this because of the ir desire to establ i sh or 
maintain their perceived legit imacy . Thus , in the case of 
teaching hospital s ,  they may seek to establish relationships 
with other hospitals solely because others have al ready 
formed such relationships . Being the only stand - alone 
hospital in the market may give the impress ion that a 
hospital provides substandard care , is poorly run , or l acks 
strategic vis ion . Thus , to create a more favorable 
perception, hospitals may alter their behavior and 
part i c ipate in all iances with other hospi tal s . 
Two isomorphi c  forces are selected for discuss ion . 
Coerc ive and normat ive pressures are act ive forces that 
impose constraints on teaching hospitals that need to be 
addres sed . COTHs exi st in an open environment and must 
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interact with others ; thus , are susceptible to both of these 
forces . Mimetic influences result from a fai lure to know how 
to respond to the market envi ronment . That i s ,  health care 
organizat ions may observe the market forces and feel the 
need to respond , but simply are not sure how ; ·thus , they 
engage in mime.t ic behavior . In health care , there is a l ong 
history of independence and autonomy among health care 
providers ( Starr , 1 9 8 2 ) , and it is unlikely hospitals will 
deviate from this without being persuaded in some way by 
market or organi zat ional factors ( see Pfef fer & Salanci k ,  
1 9 7 8 ) . Thus , mimetic isomorphi sm may be seen to b e  the 
product of the other two sets of forces . Therefore , for the 
purpose of this study, only coercive and normat ive pressures 
are analyzed . Figure 1 presents the theoretical model used 
in this study . In sum, both coercive and normative pressures 
are as sociated with the strategic responses that teaching 
hospitals make in response to changes occurring within their 
health care markets . 
Strategic Responses 
Among Teaching Hospitals 
Figure 1 .  Theoret i cal Conceptuali zat ion of I somorphi c  
Pressures .  
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Teaching Hospitals in an Inst itut ional Envi ronment 
As mentioned earl ier,  health care , in general , is a 
heavi ly regulated industry ;  however,  COTHs may face even 
greater social , cultural , and governmental pressures . Thi s  
i s  because many COTHs are control led by the state and , 
according to Scott ( 1 9 92 ) , the state represents one of the 
more s igni fi cant inst itutional structures in the modern 
worl d .  Being control l ed by the state results in COTHs having 
to operate in both health care market s  and the pol it i cal 
arenas . Many COTHs must deal with strict requirement s in 
terms of personnel and purchasing i ssues , restrict ions on 
the acquisition of capital , and other unnecessary and 
burdensome pol itical interference ( Iglehart , 1 9 9 5 ) . 
Thi s  has l ed to the conclusion that COTHs , as a whole , are 
inordinately complex , inflexible structures that are , as a 
resul t ,  slow to act ( Thier , 1 9 9 4 ) . For example , before the 
Univers i ty of Colorado Hospital at Denver cut its legal and 
f inancial ties with the state it reported facing a number of 
operational constraints ,  such as : 
• i t s  administrat ive funct ions were under the j urisdict ion 
of state bureaucracy ; 
• it was required to use the state purchasing system; 
• it was not a l l owed to enter into j oint ventures with 
other hospital s ;  
• i t s  ability to borrow money was precluded by the state , 
and when money was found , the state used it to cover 
short falls in their own operations ( Johnson, 1990 ) 
In sum , COTHs operate in an environment that i s  
bureaucratically inf luenced and often outside their 
immediate control , all of .which makes t imely responses to 
growing environmental pressures di f f icul t . 
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Weber ( 196 8 )  argued that bureaucracy was such an 
e f f i c ient and powerful means of managing that , once 
est abl i shed , the momentum of bureaucracy was irreversible . 
Over the long run , rational decis ions are made that tend to 
const ruct an environment that constrains the organi zat ion ' s  
abi l i ty to change in l ater years (DiMaggio & Powel l ,  198 3 ) . 
Strategic choices are both selected within and constrained 
by the institut ional framework of the organi zat ion ( Peng & 
Heath,  1996 ) . Organizat ions are constrained to act ions that 
are acceptable and supportable by both the external ( i . e . , 
market ) and internal ( i . e . , hospital ) institut ional 
environments (Aldrich & Fiol , 1994 ) . 
Indeed , these added inst itutional constraints 
contribute to COTHs being strategically challenged . Thi s  
s ituat ion may inhibit COTHs from obtaining the needed 
resources from the ir envi ronment and make the requisite 
organi zational and other strategic responses to sustain and 
enhance the ir organizat ional survival . Among the many 
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strategic responses available t o  COTHs , one that i s  o f  great 
importance in the restructuring health care environment i s  
the format ion o f  strategic relat ionships with other 
organi zat ions . This response , however ,  is especially 
chal lenging to COTHs because it requires that they be able 
to make maj or and di fficult decis ions dealing with 
organi zat ional structure , the real locat ion of admini strat ive 
powe r ,  and , poss ibly even , the restructuring of cl inical 
product ion processes . Deci s ions such as these are diff icult 
given the insti tutional structures within which COTHs 
operat e .  
The fol lowing sections discuss further the concept and 
formation of interorgani zat ional relat ionships as a 
strategic response to the changing health care environment . 
The Use of Interorganizational Rel at ionships 
From a resource dependency perspect ive , all 
organi zat ions fall short of having access to all of · the 
resources needed to meet ful ly their obj ect ives . They thus 
engage in behaviors designed to assure access to those 
resources over t ime ( Pfef fer & Salancik,  1 9 7 8 ) . 
Organi zations are not autonomous ent ities ( Johnson & 
Matt son , 1 9 82 ) , but are dependent upon other organizat ions 
that supply the resources central to the ir survival 
(Alexander & Morrisey ,  1 9 8 9 ; Pfeffer & Salancik,  1 9 7 8 )  . . Thi s 
forces organizations to enter into exchanges with one 
. another to acquire the needed resources they inherent ly 
l ack . Levin and White ( 1 9 6 1 )  argued that these exchanges 
provide the framework for understanding the rel ationship 
between organi zat ions . Since organi zations operate within 
the context of their environments (Ol iver,  1 9 9 0 ) , the i r  
performance and perhaps even their survival may depend on 
the exchanges and linkages they have with other 
organi zat ions . 
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The need for obtaining certain resources necessary for 
success and survival puts organi zat ions in a pos i t ion where 
they must begin to estab l i sh interorgani zat ional l i nkages 
(Aldrich , 1 9 7 9 ) . Interorgani zat ional relationships become a 
mechanism by which a stable flow of needed resources are 
acquired and ensured . Resources for hospitals include 
pat i ent s ,  technology, personnel , cl inical expert ise , 
capital , and favorable regulat ions , to name a few . 
Despite relying on the environment for necessary 
resources , organizations strongly desire to remain 
independent and autonomous ( Pfeffer & Salancik,  1 9 7 8 )  Thus , 
i t  i s  only reluctantly that organizations give up some 
independence and autonomy to enter into interorgani zat ional 
relat ionships . Combining the institutional and resource 
dependency perspec t ives , organi zat ions may feel coerc ive or 
normat ive pressures to align with others in the market in 
order to gain and secure needed resources . However,  
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organizat ions can be expected t o  weigh the advantages gained 
through partnering against reduct ions in independence that 
may resul t from entering into interorgani zat ional 
relationships ( Provan, 1 9 8 8 ) . 
There are a number of needs for which organizations may 
be w i l l ing to forgo some autonomy and independence (Al ter & 
Hage , 1 9 9 3 ; Starkweather,  1 9 8 1 ) . Al ter and Hage ident i f ied 
the need for expert ise and financial resources . Obtaining 
expert ise allows organi z�tions to gain opportunities to 
respond more quickly to environmental changes , manage 
uncertainty, and enter new markets . Addit ionally, 
organi zat ions may seek interorganizat ional relat ionships to 
acquire a means for distribut ion , access technology, 
divers i fy into new businesses , achieve economies of scale , 
or overcome regulatory barriers ( Lorange & Roos , 1 9 9 3 ) . With 
respect to hospital s ,  Starkweather suggested that they might 
combine to enhance their survival in market s  in which there 
is excess capacity in beds or services . 
A number of possible advantages exi st for forming 
interorganizat ional relationships . For one , they offer a 
vehic l e  for retaining some autonomy and independence . I f  
managed correctly,  interorganizat ional relat ionships can 
increase the power of participat ing organizat ions and even 
reduce their dependence on other organizations ( Pfeffer & 
Salancik,  1 9 7 8 ) . Furthermore , interorganizational 
relationships help to stabi l i ze economic activities through 
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the use o f  favorable , interdependent , and mutually 
supportive activities among part ic ipants ( Powel l ,  1 9 9 0 ) . By 
col l aborat ing with others , organizat ions experience 
accelerated learning that helps them overcome or avoid 
threats in the envi ronment whi le helping them to take 
advantage of opportunities . This consequence has been 
termed adapt ive efficiency ; which includes , the advantages 
of speed , flexibility ,  and qual ity gained through network 
membership (Alter & Hage , 1 9 93 ) . In a health care 
environment that has been characteri zed as turbulent , 
interorgani zat ional relat ionships should increase the l evel 
of organizat ional stabi l ity by reduc ing , controlling , 
prevent ing ,  or predict ing uncertaint ies associated with the 
environment (Longest , 1 9 8 0 ;  Pennings , 1 9 8 1 ) . 
Emergence of the Strategic Hospital Al l iance 
Interorganizat ional relat ionships come in many forms 
and are known by as many names . The spectrums of 
interorgani zat ional arrangements includes loosely to t ight ly 
structured partnerships ;  arm ' s  length bargaining to total 
integration ; or spot market transactions to the 
internali zation of markets (Thorel l i ,  1 9 8 6 ) . Along these 
spectra , Lewis ( 1 9 9 0 )  ident ified three interorgani zational 
relat ionships ; they are acquisit ions , strategic all iances , 
and arm ' s l ength transactions . An acquisition gives buyers 
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ful l control over acquired organi zat ions . Thi s usually 
involves organizations that are in closely related 
bus inesses . When organizations are not closely related , 
acquisit ion may not be the best strategy . This may be 
especially true for COTHs , given their extended mi ss ions as 
compared to other community hospital s . Acquisition of 
teaching hospitals by for-profit companies might expand or 
con"sol idate their mi ssions beyond acceptable leve l s ,  thus , 
compromi sing the miss ions of the teaching hospital s . Thi s  
di sparity i n  mi ssions could lead t o  the adopt ion of 
alternat ive interorganizational strategies that fall short 
of complete acqui sition , whi ch could offer greater lati tude 
for accommodating miss ion incompat ibil it ies . 
A second form of interorgani zat ional relat ionships 
discussed by Lewis ( 1 9 9 0 )  is the arm ' s l ength transaction ,  
which represents one of the more common methods used by 
organi zat ions to obtain needed resources . Arm ' s  length 
transact ions may be based on standing rel ationships with 
other organi zat ions ; however ,  there i s  no sharing of risk . 
Any resources being obtained in this manner are dependent on 
both what suppl iers are wi l l ing to provide and the terms o f  
est abl i shed agreements . Using arm ' s  length transactions may 
result in relat ionships that are inflexible and poss ibly 
discont inuous ; thus , creating a high degree of dependency 
and uncertainty for the organizations involved . In a 
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turbulent and uncertain environment this may be quite costly 
to the success of the organi zat ion . 
St rategic alliances can overcome the di ff iculties and 
negative effects of the prior two interorganizat ional 
arrangement s .  Strategic all iances allow the organizat ions to 
be relat ively free to exchange resources in their pursuit of 
j oint growth ( Powell , 1 9 9 0 ) . In contrast to acqui sitions , 
strategic alliances allow organizat ions to combine only 
those functions each organi zat ion needs to provide 
compet it ive strength . This can be a vital strategy in an 
ins t itutionalized envi ronment where a formal trans fer of 
ownership may be di f f i cul t ( Peng & Heath , 1 9 9 6 ) . Strategic 
al l i ances allow organizat ions to mix the resources needed to 
meet both individual and mutual goals and obj ect ives . 
Additionally,  strategic alliances allow organi zat ions to 
share the risks , maintain more control , and create an 
environment conducive for mutual ongoing adj ustment s between 
involved organi zations , thus , gaining far more resources and 
greater competitive advantage than would be possible using 
arm ' s l ength transactions . 
Interorganizat ional relat ionships ,  such as strategic 
a l l i ances , have emerged in many industries as maj or 
organizational approaches to gaining compet i t ive advantage 
over rivals in the market ( Lorange & Roos , 1 9 93 ) . The 
interorgani zat ional relat ionship is the mechanism for 
collective organizat ional actions , which are continually 
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shaped and restructured by the organizat ions involved ( Ring 
& Van de Ven , 1 9 94 ) . Strategic all iances are one form of 
interorgani zat ional relationships that can range from 
informal arrangements found between contractors and sub­
contractors to more formal arrangement s such as the j oint 
ventures found throughout the computer industry ( Dess , 
Rasheed, McLaughin, & Priem , 1 9 9 5 ; Kanter,  1 9 9 4 ) . These 
networks are characteri zed by flexibility,  decentrali zed 
control , and lateral ties that allow informat ion to flow 
across formal boundaries (Ring & Van de Ven, 1 9 94 ) . The 
inherent downside to these relat ionships is an inabil ity to 
take deci s ive strategic actions due to the absence of 
empowered centralized decision-making structures . 
SHAs as Interorgani zat ional Arrangement s in Health Care 
In health care , strategic all i ances bring rival 
hospitals together to gain col lectively a competit ive 
advantage over others and enhance their abi l ity to survive 
as wel l as thrive within the marketplace . As previously 
defined in Chapter 1 ,  these hospital alignments are known as 
s t rategic hospital all iances ( SHAs ) , speci fically : 
two or more hospi tals in a given market that come 
together to genera te cri t i cal competi tive advan tages 
and pursue their collective survival in the market .  
( Luke , Olden, & Bramble , 1 9 9 7 ) 
4 5  
Thus , SHAs , as defined here , include the ful l range of 
strategic interorganizat ional relat ionships ranging from 
ful l ownership to loose network arrangements .  Luke and Olden 
( 1 9 9 5 )  found that by the middle of 1 9 9 5  over 55% of urban 
acute care hospitals and 6 0 %  of pat ient days were contro l l ed 
by SHAs . More important than the number of hospitals 
belonging to SHAs may be the degree to which SHAs dominate 
their markets . It has been found that in some markets , SHAs 
have become dominant players , coll ect ively contro l l ing over 
7 0 %  of the pat ient days ( Luke , Ros siter,  Swisher , & Bramb l e ,  
1 9 9 5 )  . 
Many reasons exi st as to why organi zat ions should come 
together to form interorgani zat ional relat ionships such as 
s t rategic all iances . In health care , there are unique and 
spec i f i c  reasons that precipitate their formation ( Luke , 
Olden , & Bramble , 1 9 9 7 ) . As discussed earl ier,  foremost i s  
the threat o f  managed care i n  the market . As hospitals 
combine with others to form SHAs they collect ively increase 
their geographic presence ; thus , they offer greater spat i a l  
coverage , thereby increasing their leverages i n  negotiat ions 
for manage care contract s .  Joining together at the local 
l evel also allows organizat ions to devel op health care 
product s  that enhance their positions in the markets . For 
examp l e , in Houston, Memorial Healthcare System and the 
S i sters of Charity have formed a SHA to develop outpat ient 
c l inics and insurance products [ such as , ful ly insured 
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health maintenance organization (HMO) , preferred provider 
. organizat ion ( PPO) , point of service ( PO S )  and self 
insurance product s )  as wel l  as run a medi cal service 
organi zat ion (MSO) for phys icians . The alliance not only 
covers the Houston market , but also extends to over 3 0  other 
count ies in Texas . 
Additionally, j oining together also provides hospitals 
with the countervai l ing power needed to of fset the dominance 
of managed care companies . By j oining SRAs , hospital s f ind 
themselves in better pos it ions to become system builders and 
l eaders rather than watching other groups such as managed 
care companies or physician groups take the lead in system 
formation ( Luke , Olden , & Bramble , 1 9 9 7 ) . 
Clearly, COTHs need to part i c ipate in the restructuring 
that is taking place in the hospital industry .  
Unfortunately , we know l ittle about the extent o f  their 
part i c ipat ion or what the determinants of the ir 
part i cipation might be . 
This research examines the interorganizat ional 
relationships of COTHs in relation to their local health 
care market structures . Resources in the market play a 
substantial rol e in influencing the strategic behavior of 
COTHs . In addition ,  the institut ional i zed environment in 
which COTHs operate further influences the ir behaviors . 
As indicated earl ier,  pat ients are one resource that 
COTHs must secure in order to survive and continue the i r  
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threefold miss ion . Securing pat ients , especially those with 
insurance or the abil ity to pay, i s  necessary for their 
f inancial viabil ity . Thus , to increase the certainty of a 
constant pat ient flow, COTHs may be wi l l ing to rel inqui sh 
some autonomy and independence and partner with others in 
the market . Aligning with others i s  affected by both the 
coercive and normat ive influences within the market as well 
as their own institut ional i zed environment . One question i s  
whether market environments exert enough pressure on the 
COTHs for them to overcome the constraints of their 
insti tut ional i zed environments and seek membership in SRAs ? 
Another quest ion has to do with the abi l ity of COTHs to 
control the SRAs , once they enter into mul t iorgani zat ional 
relat ionships . Put another way , wi l l  COTHs become dominant 
players in their alliances , or wi l l  they become non- dominant 
members , or simply opt to go it alone? To explore the 
strategic role of COTHs in their market s  the next sect ion 
develops a typology that builds on those important ques t i ons 
regarding the strategic roles of COTHs . 
COTH Typol ogy 
As COTHs enter various forms of strategic 
interrelat ionships , it becomes increasingly important to 
ident ify the part icular types of relat ionships . Typologie s  
are used for many reasons and usually for a speci f i c  
purpose . In this study , a typol ogy is needed to both 
c l a s s i fy patterns of COTH part icipat ion in SRAs and to 
fac i l i tate the analys is of those patterns . 
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Joining a SRA creates a number o f  interorganizat ional 
relationships between part ic ipat ing organi zat ions , thus 
rais ing issues regarding power and strategic decis ion 
making . Alexander and Morlock ( 1 994 ) suggest that an 
important source of power is having control over the 
resources subsumed within the structural f ramework . In 
mul t iorganizational arrangements such as those involving 
SRAs , control over both strategic and operat ional dec i s ions 
wi l l  vary across the part ic ipating members . Dominant 
partners ,  to the extent they exist , can be expected to make 
or control most of the important operating and strategic 
decis ions for their group . Within SRAs , a dominant member 
might even attempt to manage the other members as if they 
were wholly owned subsidiaries ( Ki l l ing , 1 9 8 3 ) . The degree 
of dominance enj oyed by COTHs within SRAs is a criti cal 
concept to analyze when examining COTH relat ionships and 
thus i s  an integral part of the typology developed here . 
To ident ify the COTH ' s  relat ionship to its SRA and 
d i f ferent iate between COTHs that enj oy power pos it ions from 
those that do not , the concept of organizational dominance 
wi l l  be used in the typology . In their previous work, Luke , 
Olden and Bramble ( 1 9 9 7 ) , ident i f ied both dominant and 
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d i f fuse SHA structures , which re flected the degree t o  which 
power was centered in a single all iance member or 
distributed relat ively equally among the partners . It i s  
important to note that dominance is not necessarily t i e d  t o  
ownership . In fact a n  organi zat ion can dominate without 
being in a maj or stake holder posi t ion , such as in 5 0 - 5 0  
partnerships (Kill ing , 1 9 8 3 ) . However ,  i t  i s  the power o f  a 
single hospital or of a local hospital system relat ive to 
other SHA members that , in this typology , i s  used to 
determine posit ions of dominance . 
Dominant SHA partners , either s ingle or mul t i - ownership 
are ident i f ied as those that control the maj ority of beds 
within their SHAs . Hospitals or systems that control 7 0 %  or 
more of their SHA ' s  beds are defined to be dominant players . 
Therefore , at one end of the spectrum of dominance ,  COTHs 
that stand- alone or are with a local c luster of the s ame 
system ( i . e . , common ownership hospita l s )  would ,  by 
de f inition, be clas s i fi ed as dominant , as ful ly contro l l i ng .  
At the other end, those with two or more partners , none o f  
which i s  i n  a controll ing ' posi t ion, by virtue of i t s  
relat ive s i ze within its SHA, are classif ied a s  diffuse . 
Going beyond the organizat ional rel ationship among SHA 
members , the relationship of the SHA and its hospitals to 
the market must also be considered . Again dominance and the 
power to inf luence are key . 
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By de f inition, SHAs exist t o  provide part ic ipat ing 
organizations a competit ive advantage over rivals in the i r  
market s . In order to di f ferent iate the degree of compet i t ive 
advantage gained by part icipat ing in SHAs , COTHs are also 
distinguished by their pos it ions of market dominance . To the 
extent that SHAs are dominant players in their respective 
markets , the part ic ipat ing hospi tals , including COTHS , could 
be as sumed to share ih the collect ive ' s  dominant pos it ion . 
Alternatively , there also may be market s  where stand alone 
COTHs may be in positions of market dominance .  Thus , the 
typology distinguishes market dominance for both unal igned 
and al igned ( in which case dominance is measured for the 
SHA) COTHs . 
One determinant of market dominance is the abi l ity t o  
influence consumer choice ( Stewart , 1 9 9 6 ) , which can be 
measured by the share of the market controlled by individual 
players ( free - standing hospitals and/or SHAs ) within the 
market . The percentage of pat ient days provides one .measure 
of market share and wi l l  be adapted for use in this study . 
I n  many markets the top four firms ( either stand alone 
hospitals of SHAs ) control 75% of the market ; thus , a 
hospital or SHA that has a market share of 2 0 %  would be a 
dominant player in its market . 
The two concepts , organizational dominance and market 
dominance, are combined to form two dimensions in the 
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typol ogy ( see Figure 2 ) . This classificat ion dist inguishes 
the degree to whi ch COTHs exert power within their 
organi zat ions as wel l  as their markets , ei ther as stand­
alone teaching hospital s or within strategic all iances . By 
def init ion, stand-alone COTHs wi l l  have high organizational 
dominance ,  but. may or may .not enj oy dominant market 
pos i t ions . 
Two addi tional terms are added to Figure 2 to help 
c l a s s i fy the degree of organizat ional and market dominance 
that COTHs enj oy . COTHs high on market dominance dimension 
are l abeled strategic whi le COTHs with high organi zat ional 
dominance are labeled dominant . These terms capture the 
abi l i ty of COTHs and their SHAs to be maj or strategic 
players in their markets as wel l  as have an influent ial 












Figure 2 .  Typology of the Organi zat ional and Market Posit ion 
of Teaching Hospitals 
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The cell labeled both strategic and dominant ( see 
F igure 2 )  represents COTHs ( or the ir local systems ) that are 
organi zat ionally dominant as wel l  as dominate their markets . 
COTHs in this cell are assumed to provide or control not 
only tertiary services in their market s ,  but a signi f i cant 
range of primary care services as wel l . From the perspective 
of organi zat ional dominance ,  teaching hospitals in thi s cell  
would be assumed to be either free - s tanding or to dominate 
the SRAs of which they are members . For example , two COTHs - ­
Hart ford Hospital and the University of Connecticut 
Hospital - -have al igned with one another in the Hartford MSA . 
The partnership fal l s  short of common ownership ; however ,  
Hartford hospital controls 7 8 %  o f  the bed capacity and thus 
cons idered organi zat ional ly dominant . Addi t ionally,  the 
Hartford/University of Connecticut SRA provides over 4 1 %  of 
the patient days in the Hartford market . The SRA is thus 
considered a dominant strategic player in the MSA and 
therefore Hartford University i s  a l so considered dominate 
i t s  market as wel l  as its partners . 
In general , it is expected that stand-alone COTHs are 
l ikely to be highly " strategic"  in market s  characteri zed by 
smal ler populat ions , simply by virtue of the small number of 
compet i t ors that are found in the smaller markets . For 
examp l e ,  in Charlottesvi l l e ,  the Univers ity of Virginia 
Medi cal Center i s  a stand-alone hospital and one of only two 
hospitals in the market . I t s  s i ze and capab i l ity to of fer a 
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mul t itude o f  services t o  a market with l ittle compet i t i on 
creates an envi ronment where the COTH is able to become not 
only a dominant player,  but provide a wide range of services 
to the local popul ation . 
Staying with organi zat ionally dominant COTHs , the cel l 
in Figure 2 labeled dominant i l lustrates situat ions where 
COTHs are organi zat ional ly dominant , but they ( or their SHA) 
are not maj or players in their markets . COTHs in this 
category may again be either stand-alone hospitals or SHA 
members . Hermann Hospital in Houston ' s  Texas Medi cal Center 
is an example of a stand- alone COTH that does not have a 
high degree of market presence . Hermann is an isolated 
hospital that unlike the Univers ity of Virginia i s  located 
in a l arge market and must compete with not only a number of 
community hospita l s ,  but also a number of other large 
teaching facilit ies . Interestingly , Hermann ' s  position could 
change as i t  is now exploring a strategic alliance with a 
maj or community hospital SHA in the Houston area named the 
Memorial Health System .  Should this occur , the new al ignment 
woul d l ikely be classi fied as strategic , but Hermann might 
no longer be classified �s dominant . 
Where competit ion is greater , stand-alone COTHs may 
need to j oin SHAs ( or create the ir own) in order to gain 
market share , let alone dominate their markets . An example 
of a SHA member in this category i s  Georgia Bapti s t  Medical 
Center . Though the Georgia Bapt ist Medi cal Center i s  the 
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dominant hospital o f  the SHA, the SHA fails t o  be a maj or 
player in the Atlanta market . The SHA accounts for 6 . 1 % of 
the pat ient days in the market and , thus , is not considered 
to be market dominant . 
Teaching hospi tals that have a low degree of 
organizational dominance ,  but are in SHAs that are dominant 
players in the marketplace are i l lustrated in the cell 
labeled strategic .  S ince , by def inition ,  stand-alone COTHs 
are organi zat ionally dominant , only COTHs that are members 
of SHAs would be found in this cel l . COTHs in this cell are 
l ikely to be team players serving as referral or specialty 
hospitals for their respect ive alliances . For example ,  in 
Tampa Bay, Florida , Tampa General , a COTH hospital , i s  in an 
SHA that i s  control led by Columbia . Indeed , Tampa General i s  
the only hospital in the alliance that i s  not owned by 
Columbia and i t  represent s only about 2 0 %  of the SHA ' s  total 
bed capacity . Being the only large teaching fac i l i ty in the 
a l l i ance , Tampa General l ikely serves the tert iary and 
specialty needs of the SHA ' s  community hospital s .  Together 
with Tampa General , the Colombia- control led SHA enj oys a ­
st rong market pos ition ,  capturing 4 5 %  of the pat ient days in 
the market . Thus , though Tampa General i s  not 
organizat ionally dominant ; it does have , through its 
part i cipation in its SHA , a strong strategic market 
pos i t i on .  
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The f inal cell characterizes COTHs that are neither 
organizat ionally dominant nor do they have strategic market 
posit ions . Again, only COTHs that are members of SRAs are 
cons idered . Northwestern Memorial Hospital in Chicago is a 
typical example of a COTH that fal l s  into the " non ­
s trategic /non- dominant " category . Northwestern is part of a 
seven hospital SRA and controls only 2 3 %  of the SRA ' s  beds . 
Addit ionally the SRA provides only about 14 % of the pat ient 
days in the market .  This and all the other examples 
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Development of Hypotheses 
S ix hypotheses are developed and tested in this study . 
The f irst two address the inf luence of coercive market 
pressures and normat ive organizat ional pressures on teaching 
hospital part icipation in SHAs . The last four hypotheses are 
concerned with the typology . Speci f ically the market and 
organizational dominance strategies expl ained in the 
typology sect ion . Again the influence of coercive market 
pressures and normat ive organi zat ional pressures are 
examined in relat ion to COTH market and organi zat ional 
dominance , respectively . 
The Influence of Coercive Pressures 
It has been reported that , on average , COTH hospitals 
operate in highly consolidated and rivalrous market s  ( Luke & 
Brambl e ,  1 9 9 6 ) . In addition ,  managed care , l arge businesses , 
and business coal itions are often present in these marke t s , 
a l l  of which af fect the compet it ive dec isions of the COTHs . 
These factors represent some of the coercive pressures 
facing COTH hospital s .  
Membership of teaching hospitals in SHAs i s ,  in part , 
dependent on the structures of the markets . Combining 
ins t i tut ional and resource dependency theory, a COTH wi l l  
only forfeit some of its autonomy t o  j oin a SHA i f  there i s  
suff i cient coercive pressure such that the COTH ' s  viabi l i ty 
i s  threatened . In market s  where coercive forces ( e . g . , 
5 9  
for essential resources ,  COTHs may feel i t  necessary to 
part icipate in hospital all iances in order to assure acces s  
to needed resources .  Addi tionally, COTHs may al ign with 
other hospitals to increase stabil ity and gain power over 
the i r  rival s ,  while at the same t ime buffering themselves 
against the e f fects of external coercive forces. within the i r  
market s .  In sum, the coercive pressures i n  the marketplace 
are l i kely to be posit ively related to COTHs part icipat ing 
in SHAs . 
The Influence of Normat ive Pressures 
COTHs are also subj ected to normat ive pressures that 
emanate from their internal organizat ional structures .  I n  
a l l  organi zations , much organizat ional behavior i s  dictated 
and specified by standard operating procedures ,  such as 
rul e s , convent ions , and routines (March & Olsen, 1 9 8 9 ) . In 
the case of COTHs , these rules pressure them to conform to 
organi zational norms as they interact in their market 
envi ronments .  Many normat ive rules are often regarded a s  
restrict ive , impos ing varying degrees of constraint on 
organi zat ional behavior ( Scot t ,  1 9 9 5 ) . Academic medical 
centers owned or operated by the state government have been 
described as having insurmountable obstacles with regard to 
operating in the health care environment of the 1 9 9 0 s  
(Montague , 1 9 93 ) . For example , i n  a feasib i l i ty study 
concerning the privat ization of Virginia ' s  teaching 
hospitals it was concluded that , Virginia ' s  teaching 
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hospitals are not adapt t o  the rapidly shi ft ing health care 
environment because of the system of regulatory restraints 
in which they are forced to operate ( Sgro , 1 9 9 5 ) . 
The more COTHs are controlled by the state or university,  
the harder it becomes for them to part icipate in strategic 
arrangements and al ign with other hospital s .  To become more 
e f f i c ient and secure needed resources through 
interorgani zational arrangement s ,  i t  i s  clear that COTHs 
mus t  overcome these obstacles (Blumenthal & Meye r ,  1 9 9 3 ) . By 
breaking loose from state re strict ions COTH hospitals may 
better positions themselves to become more competit ive and 
f l exible in their attempts to secure the resources needed 
for the COTH ' s  viabil ity ( Johnson , 1 9 93 ) . Thus , the 
normat ive pressures that result from the COTHs 
organi zational structures are likely to have a negative 
inf luence on the l ikelihood that COTHs wi l l  part icipate in 
SHAs . 
In sum, teaching hospitals face two opposing forces a s  
they contemplate part ic ipat ion i n  SHAs . Whi le coercive 
pressures brought about by the market may influence COTHs t o  
j oin SHAs , the normat ive pressures o f  their organi zat ional 
structures act as barriers opposing their affil iat ion with 
others . Thus , 
H, : COTH part i c ipat ion in SHAs i s  expected to be 
pos it ively assoc iated with the level of coerc ive 
pressure in the market . 
H2 : COTH part ic ipat ion in SHAs is expected to be 
negatively as sociated with the l evel of normat ive 
pressures within their organi zat ions . 
Organi zat ional and Market Dominance 
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SHAs are formed for the spec i f ic purpose o f  generating 
competit ive advantages and ensuring collect ive survival . The 
chall enge for COTHs is to choose SHAs that wi l l  help them 
obtain a market dominant position and continue to ful f i l l  
the i r  missions . Whi le COTHs i n  market s  with strong coercive 
forces are likely to part icipate in SHAs and seek out the 
most prosperous relat ionships , their associated normat ive 
pressures within their organi zational structures make them , 
at t imes , less than ideal partners . 
As discussed previously , organizat ional dominance i s  
critical t o  teaching hospital s a s  they consider partnering 
with others . S ince organizat ions wish to maintain thei r  
autonomy and independence ( Pfeffer & Salancik,  1 9 7 8 ) , COTHs 
would be expected to pre fer part ic ipation in SHAs in which 
they would be in dominant pos it ions and retain much of t he i r  
autonomy and independence .  However ,  choosing the perfect 
partner i s  not always feasible . In many cases , market s  have 
al ready experienced much consolidation that l imit s  the 
number of available potent ial partners . Also the 
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organizational structures o f  COTHs may inhibit partner 
choice as well as the type of arrangements that are poss ible 
or the speed at which negot iat ions take place . 
Both coercive and normat ive pressures that teaching 
hospitals face ef fect their choices of potent ial partners . 
Thus , the abi l ity of COTHs to improve their market pos i t ion 
and control their organi zat ion ( i . e . , SHA) i s  related to the 
coerc ive market and normat ive organizat ional pressures that 
exist . Thus , the fol lowing hypotheses are proposed : 
H3 : COTH market dominance , as a stand-alone or via a SHA, 
is posit ively associated with the level of coercive 
pressures in the market . 
H. : COTH market dominance , as a stand- alone or via a SHA , 
is negat ively associated with the level of normat ive 
pressures in the market . 
Hs : COTH organi zat ional dominance ,  in SHAs , is posi t ively 
associ ated with the level of coercive pressures 
within its organi zat ion structure . 
H. : COTH organi zat ional dominance ,  in SHAs , is negat ively 
as sociated with the level of normat ive pressures 
within its organi zat ion structure . 
Figure 1 is revi sited and further refined in Figure 4 
to represent the six hypotheses proposed in this research . 
Thi s representation shows the inf luence of both coercive 
market and normat ive organizat ional forces . 
C o ercive Pressures/ 
M arket Structure 
• Rival hospitals or SHAs 
Norm ative Pressures/ 
Organizational Structure 
• University teaching hospital 
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• Managed care organizations 
• Non-university teaching hospital 
• Large physician groups • Public ownership 
• Large businesses 
• Private ownership 
• Business coalitions • Number of FTEs 
• SHA penetration • Number of Services 
• Primary Care Physicians per Capita 
SHA M em bership 
Market Dominance 
Organiational Dominance 
Figure 4 .  Conceptual Model of Teaching Hospital 
Part i c ipat ion in SRAs and their Market and 
Organi zat ional Dominance 
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Some of the specific factors ( di scussed in the proceeding 
chapter) that are thought to represent these forces are a l so 
presented in Figure 4 .  
In the chapters that follow the methods used for 
testing these hypotheses , the resul t s  and the implications 
of the findings are discussed . 
CHAPTER 3 
Methodology 
Thi s chapter describes the research design and the 
variables used to test the hypotheses presented in the 
preceding chapter . The description of how the variables were 
measured along with their sources are presented . Finally the 
research design and the statistical procedures used to test 
the hypotheses are explained . 
Variable Sources and Measurement 
Variables for the study were chosen based on face 
val i dity,  theoretical relevance , and support in the 
l i terature . Consi stent with other studies ( see Alexander & 
Morrisey ,  1 98 9 ;  Fennel l ,  1 9 8 0 ) , this method of variable 
selection allows for interpretat ion of the specific 
vari ables as correlates of COTH parti c ipat ion in SHAs . Data 
were gathered from various sources to create a unique 
database of local hospital networks and systems . 
Database Descript ion and Data Sources 
The data for thi s study come primari ly from a unique 
database created by the Will iamson Institute at Virginia 
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Commonwealth University . Us ing data from the American 
Hospitals Association ' s  (AHA) annual survey as a foundation ,  
faculty a t  the Will iamson Institute have , since 1 9 8 9 ,  
cont inual ly monitored and updated national data on mult i ­
hospital system membership , local hospital systems , and 
strategic hospital alliances . Data on hospital 
interorganizat ional relat ionships are col lected and 
val idated in a mult iple step process . Thi s  process includes : 
scanning the popular l i terature ( e . g .  Modern Healthcare ) ; 
phone calls to informed persons in the market ; and 
monitoring other sources such as press releases , collegial 
networks , and Internet sites of health care organizat ions 
( see M i l l er et al . ,  1 9 9 6 ) . 
Using thi s database overcomes a number of l imitations 
in the AHA survey data . First , many merged hospitals report 
themselves as one organi zat ion , but may indeed have two or 
more hospitals in various locat ions . For example , in Durham , 
North Carol ina , Wake Medical Center is reported as one 
ent ity,  but has four hospitals distributed throughout the 
metropol itan area . A second l imitat ion in the AHA survey 
data is the facts that many mUl t i - hospital systems do not 
report themselves as such and thus gq unident i fied . A third 
shortcoming of AHA survey data is the inherent lag time in 
reporting hospital system informat ion . This problem is 
amp l i f i ed given the rapid changes occurring in the heal t h  
care environment . A f inal shortcoming i s  that whil e  
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hospi tals are combining into many di fferent combinat ions , 
the AHA survey data fai l s  to adequately ident i fy and report 
interorganizat ional arrangements that fall short of ful l 
ownership . 
Data are also drawn from other sources to enhance the 
Wi l l iamson Institute ' s  data on local hospi tal systems and 
networks . Data used to measure market structure variables 
come from InterStudy ;  Nat ional Business Coalition on Heal t h  
(NBCH) , Dun and Bradstreet , the Medical Group Management 
Associat ion (MGMA) , and the Area Resource File (ARF ) . Data 
measuring the organizat ional characteristics of COTHs come 
f rom the AHA Annual Survey and the AAMC data on teaching 
hospit al s .  The combinat ions of these data sources provide 
useful information to measure the influence of market and 
organi zational factors on COTH part i c ipation in SHAs . 
Dependent Variables 
In the first two hypotheses , the dependent variable is 
measured by COTH part ic ipation in SHAs . This measure i s  a 
di chotomous variable indicat ing either a yes or no with 
respect to whether the COTH part ic ipates in an SHA . As 
di scus sed previously SHA membership was obtained from the 
Wi l l i amson Institute database . 
To test the next two hypotheses , the dependent variable 
i s  measured by whether COTHs have a position o f  dominance , 
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either within their BHAs ( i . e . , organi zational dominance ) or 
in the marketplace ( i . e . , market dominanc e ) . In each case , a 
di chotomous variable is used . Dominating a BHA organi zat ion 
was defined earl ier as the COTH having control of at least 
70% of the BHA ' s  bed capac ity . Thus by def init ion, a stand­
alone teaching hospitals are considered organi zat iona l ly 
dominant . Having a market dominant posit ion is measured by 
the teaching hospital or its BHA controll ing at least 2 0 % of 
the market ' s  patient days . Data used to measure both of 
these variables comes from the sources discussed earlier in 
thi s chapter . 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables chosen for this study measure 
the market and organizational characteri stics that are 
expected to affect the part ic ipation of COTHs in BHAs as 
wel l  as their positions of market and organi zat ional 
dominance . 
Def ining the Market 
Many of the independent variables are measured at the 
market leve l . The market for this study i s  defined as the 
metropol i t an statist ical area ( MBA) in whi ch the hospitals 
are located . Using an MBA de f inition assumes that the market 
boundaries of an individual hospital , system, or s t rategic 
network conform to the geographic boundaries of the MBA . 
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Clearly , there are hospital market s  that span beyond MSA 
boundaries as wel l  as natural ( e . g . , rivers ) and man-made 
boundaries ( e . g . , interstates ) that divide an MSA into 
dist inct markets . Nevertheless , the MSA def inition of 
hospital markets has been used in prior research ( see 
Fenne l l ,  1 9 8 0 ; Luke , 1992 ; Luke , Olden , & Bramble , 1 9 9 7 ) 
Addi t ionally, this market def inition has been found to be 
the most l i kely to capture the greatest number of hospital 
compet itors and rivals as wel l  as the crit i cal market 
resources needed by COTHs (Olden , 1 9 9 4 ) . It has also been 
argued that SHAs somet ime form to compete across MSAs 
( C lement et al . ,  1 9 9 7 ) . Nevertheless , the MSAs in which they 
are l ocated ref lect the areas in which the SHAs most 
directly intend to compete for managed care contract s .  For 
these reasons , the MSA specif i cati on of the market is used 
for this study . Metropol itan stat i stical areas are def ined 
as cont iguous socioeconomic counties or areas that have at 
l east one c ity or area with a population of at least 5 0 , 0 0 0  
and a total population o f  at least 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  ( U . S .  Department 
of Commerce , 1 9 9 0 ) . 
The following section expl ains the data sources and the 
speci f i c  measurement of the variables used in the study . 
Measures of Coercive Market Pressures 
Market variables of interest are intended to capture 
sources of coerc ive pressures that impact COTHs . Thus , 
measures from providers and buyers of health care services 
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are used . These variables are summarized i n  Table 3 .  
Variables on the buyer side measure the degree of managed 
care penetration across market s  as wel l  as the presence o f  
l arge employers and business coal it ions in the market . Those 
on the provider side represent the amount of hospital 
compet it ion in the market as measured by the number of rival 
hospitals and SRAs , the number of l arge physi ci an group 
pract ices , and the number of primary care phys icians per 
capi ta . Also on the provider side , are measures of SRA 
penetration across markets . These measures represent 
coerc ive market forces that are hypothesi zed to influence 
both the del ivery of health care services and the 
organi zat ional structures of SRAs within their local health 
care markets . 
Providers of health care services represent riva l s  to 
teaching hospital s .  Greater numbers of rival health care 
organi zat ions in the market l ead to greater uncertainty 
(Alexander & Morri sey, 1 9 8 9 ) . Thi s uncertainty is a result 
of compet it ion among hospital s ,  SRAs , and large physi ci an 
groups for managed care cont racts and the threat of l oos ing 
vital resources to compet itors in the market . Recall that 
a l i gning with others is one method for reduc ing uncertainty 
( Pfeffer & Salancik,  1 9 7 8 ) . Thus , as more health care 
organi zat ions compete for managed care contract s  and, to the 
extent hospitals are forming SRAs , it  is l ikely that COTHs 
wi l l  feel coercive pressure to a f f i l iate . Furthermore , as 
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managed care penetration increase s ,  coercion t o  affil i ate 
may come from the fear of being left out of managed care 
contracts or being forced to accept heavy discounts for 
heal th care services . Both consequences result in a loss of 
vital pat ient revenues . By al igning with others and becoming 
more l ike their counterparts ,  COTHs may be able to gain more 
power over market rivals and managed care f irms . This a l l ows 
the COTH to compete more ef fect ively for managed care 
contracts and needed pat ient revenues .  Thus , a posit ive 
relationship is expected between the number of providers 
( rival hospital s ,  BRAs , or l arge physician groups ) in the 
market and COTH part icipation in BRAs . 
Buyer side measures include the percentage of the 
popul ation in HMOs , the percentage of the populat ion 
employed in l arge companies ( greater than 1 , 0 0 0  employees ) , 
and the presence of business coalit ions in the market . Al l 
of these measures are indicators of the market power and 
negot i at ing presence of HMOs and employers . For example ,  
local employers combining into community-based organizat ions 
are able to amass the s i ze and power necessary to attempt t o  
manage the cost and qual ity of health care ( Cronin , 1 9 94 ) 
It has been argued that large businesses and business 
coal i t ions with suf ficient leverage , in terms of s i ze , have 
had an impact on health care cost s  ( Luke et al . ,  1 9 9 5 )  . In 
deed , employers both individual ly and through bus iness 
coal itions are forcing unprecedented changes in the payment 
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and delivery o f  health care (Appleby, 1 9 95 ) . As employers 
and managed care organizations gain more power in the market 
they are l i kely to exert more pressure on hospitals to 
provide care at lower costs as they manage the health of 
the ir communi ties . Teaching hospitals may feel coerced into 
seeking affil iations to make themselves more attract ive to 
buyers of health care servi ces . Thus , as previously argued, 
they are more l ikely to part icipate in SRAs to maintain 
their pat ient bases , secure managed care contract s ,  and 
compete in the markets . 
Table 3 













Percent of market population 
enrolled in managed care plans 
Percent of employees in MBA in 
businesses wither greater than 
1 , 0 0 0  employees 
1 if one or more business 
coalitions operate in the 
market ; 0 if no coalit ion 
Number of non- federal , general 
acute care hospital s in the 
market . 
The percent of pat ient days in 
the market control led by 
hospitals in SRAs 
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Data Source 
1 9 9 5  
InterBtudy 
1 9 9 5  
Dun & 
Bradst reet 
1 99 6  NBCH 
1 9 95 , 1 9 9 6  
W i l l i amson 
Ins t i tute 
Database 
1 9 9 5 , 1 9 9 6  




Table 3 ( cont ' d ) 
Variables Measuring Market Pressure 
variable Measure Data Source 
Percent Number of phys ic ians in groups 1 9 9 6  
phys i c ians in of 2 0  or more phys ic ians / MGMA Data 
large groups Number of phys icians in the MSA 
Percent Number of primary care 1 9 9 5  
primary care phys ic ians in the MSA/Total ARF Data 
phys i c ians number of phys icians in the MSA 
Notes . NBCH Nat ional Business Coalit ion for Health 
MGMA Medical Group Management Associat ion 
ARF = Area Resource File 
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Measures o f  Normative Organi zat ional Pressures 
Organi zational characteristics that capture and measure 
the l evel of normat ive organizational pressures that COTHs 
face include ownership,  the administrat ive structure , and 
the complexity of the faci l i ty . The variables that measure 
these characteri stics are l i sted in Table ' 4 .  In general , as 
di scussed in Chapter 2 ,  normat ive pressures resul t ing from 
the organizat ional characteristics of COTHs are expected to 
be negatively assoc iated with teaching hospitals 
part i c ipat ing in SHAs . Variables measuring the level of 
normative pressure COTHs face along with their ant icipated 
e f fects on SHA part i cipat ion are expl ained below . 
For-profit and not - for-profit teaching hospitals are 
examined in this study . Different ownership types have 
different needs , resources ,  miss ions and obj ectives ( Choi , 
Al l i son , & Munson, 1 9 8 5 ) . All of whi ch ef fect their 
wi l l ingness and capabil ity to j oin or become members of 
S HAs . COTHs with not - for -profit ownership status , a� 
previously argued , have more pol i c ies and procedures t o  
which they must adhere than do those of other ownership 
type s . Not - for-profit teaching hospitals have greater 
normat ive pressures of caring for the indigent populat ions 
than do their for-profit counterpart s (Anderson , Steinberg , 
& Heyssel ,  1 9 94 ) .  Thus , i t  i s  expected they wi l l  be l e s s  
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Table 4 
Variables Measuring the Organi zational Structure 
Variable Measure Data Source 
Ownership Private , public or other non- 1 9 95 COTH 
profit , and Catholic 
Administrative 1 i f  common ownership with the 1 9 9 5  COTH 
structure 
FTEs per beds 
Case Mix 




col lege of medi cine and 0 i f  a 
free - standing teaching hospital 
Number of full time equival ent s 
divided by staf fed beds 
An index the measures the 
degree of severity of the 
hospital ' s  pat ient s 
A measure of pat ient volume , 
total pat ient revenue is the 
total of inpat ient and 
outpatient revenues 
Total number of medical 
servi ces offered by the 
hospital 
1 9 9 5  AHA 
1 9 9 5  HCFA 
1 9 95 HCFA 
1 9 9 5  AHA 
Notes . COTH = Membership Directory of the Counci l  of 
Teaching Hospi tals 
l ike ly to be members of SHAs , especially SHAs with for­
profit members . 
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The administrat ive structure variables measure the 
degree to which COTHs are tied to the state or university . 
Those that are integrated with univers ity or state agency 
are more l ikely to feel those normative pressures argued 
earl ier that prevent them from affil iat ing with others in 
the markets . Independent COTHs are not part of the state or 
university, and thus do not have to overcome the addit ional 
hurdle of state or university constraint s ,  as do their 
integrated counterparts .  Therefore , it i s  expected that 
integrated COTHs will affil iate less than wi l l  independent 
COTHs . 
Other factors may also affect the normat ive pressures 
f e l t  by COTHs . Some of these stem from the s i ze and scope of 
the hospital s . As the s i ze and scope increase , the hospital 
admini strat ive structures are likely to become more comp l ex . 
Thi s  l eads to many more normative pol ic ies and procedures 
that COTHs may have to fol low .  To capture the complexity 
related to the s i ze and scope of teaching hospital s ,  the 
f o l lowing variables are used in this study : ful l - t ime 
equivalent s ( FTES ) per bed , case mix, and service mix . 
I t  i s  di f f i cult to predict the influence of these 
variables . Although they offer many advantages to SHAs , they 
also act as barriers to SHA part i cipat ion . For exampl e ,  
though hospitals j oin SHAs t o  increase their service 
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capacity, the number o f  services COTHs offer may inhibit 
other hospitals from al igning with them . Unless COTHs are 
w i l l ing to consol idate services with potent ial partners or 
t rain their residents at those locat ions , the many services 
they offer may be duplicat ive of SHA partners . Addit ional l y ,  
because of the ir teaching miss ions , COTHs often provide 
services that are not profitable ,  which again , may make 
COTHs less than attract ive as partners . S imil ar arguments 
can be made for the bed s i ze and the number of FTEs . Greater 
numbers of FTEs per bed may be associated wi th more severely 
ill pat ient populat ions , thus making COTHs more problema t i c  
as partners . It  should b e  noted that s ince this study only 
looks at COTHs and all COTHs have simi l ar organi zat ional 
structures , the effects of some of these factors might be 
hard to identify.  
Independent Control variables 
There are a number of sociodemographic factors that 
could be associated with COTHs (Luft et al . ,  1 9 8 6 ) . For 
examp l e ,  in an earlier study on mul t i - hospital affil iation, 
Fennel l  and Alexander ( 1 9 8 7 ) controlled for region as wel l  
a s  ownership and s i ze . �s discussed earl ier , the latter two 
are already to be included as variables . In this study f ive 
sociodemographic factors are controlled in the analyses ( see 
Table 5 ) . These variables include the region in which the 
COTH i s  located , the s i ze of the market , and the income , 
minority , and elderly characteristics of the market . 
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Table 5 
Independent Control variabl es 
Variable Measure Data Source 
Region l =West ; 2 =Midwest ; 3 =South 
East is the reference 
MSA populat ion Populat ion of the MSA 
Income Log of per capita income 
Minority Percent minority populat ion 
in the MSA 
Elderly 
Notes . ARF 
Percent aged popul ation in 
the MSA 
Area Resource File 
1 9 9 5  ARF 
1 9 9 5  ARF 
1 9 9 5  ARF 
1 9 9 5  HCFA 
1995  AHA 
HCFA Health Care Financ ing Administration 
Minimum Cost Data 
AHA American Hospital Associat ion Annual Surv�y 
of Hospitals 
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Analys i s  
This research wi l l  examine a group of hospitals 
designated as teaching hospitals using the definition 
spe c i f ied in Chapter 1 .  Excluded from this are COTHs l ocated 
in rural areas or outside the United States . Furthermore , 
only non- federal general acute care COTHs are included in 
this study . This excludes Veteran Affairs hospitals and 
specialty fac i l it ies such as chi ldren ' s  hospitals that might 
have COTH des ignations . The analyses presented in this 
sect ion test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2 .  
The f irst analysis examines the correl ates of SHA 
part i c ipation and tests hypotheses 1 and 2 .  This cros s ­
sectional analys is uses l ogistic regression t o  test the 
correl ates of COTH part icipat ion in SHAs . The coe f f i cients 
of the independent variables are analyzed and interpreted 
for any s igni f icant and direct ional effects on SHA 
part i c ipation, using the following mode l : 
SHA = f (MS , OC) 
where : MS market structure , and 
OC organi zat ional characteri s t i c s  
Results of t h i s  and all other analyses are presented in 
Chapter 4 .  I t  i s  ant ic ipated that coercive market forces 
wi l l  be pos i t ively correlated whi le the normat ive 
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organi zat ional forces are negatively correlated with SHA 
part i c ipat ion .  
The second and third analyses tests hypotheses 3 and 4 
as wel l  as hypotheses 5 and 6 ,  respect ively . Two different 
regressions are est imated to examine cros s - sectionally the 
market and organi zat ional dominance of eOTHs . One regre s sion 
tests the correlates of market dominance and the othe r ,  
organi zational dominance . In analyzing organizat ional 
dominance , only eOTHs that are part of SHAs are tested , 
s ince the focus is on the position of the eOTHs relat ive to 
thei r  SHA partners . As before , logi stic regress ion i s  used 
in both analyses to test the correlates of the strategic 
role of eOTHs . The two model s  tested are : 
MO f (MS , Oe) and 
00 f (MS , Oe) 
where : MD organi zat ional dominance 
00 market dominance 
MS market structure , and. 
oe organizat ional characteri s t i c s  
Logistic Regress ion 
Logistic regression is considered the standard method 
for conduct ing mul t ivariate analyses of dichotomous 
variables (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1 9 8 9 ) . When working with 
dichotomous dependent variables , such as SHA membership , 
l ogistic regression overcomes selected probl ems associated 
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with l inear regress ion . Though l inear regress ion works wel l  
wi th independent dichotomous variables , problems emerge when 
dependent variables are dichotomous . Linear regress ion 
produces bimodal dist ribut ions that l ead to unrel iable 
standard errors and est imators . Logi stic regres sion produces 
consistent estimators regardless of how the dependent 
variables are distributed (Clearly & Angel , 1 9 8 4 ) . 
Multivariate model s  allow the relationships between 
expl anatory and dependent variabl es to be examined.  
I ndividual effects are determined within the model and are 
adj usted to account for the ef fects of the other independent 
variables . The measurement of the strength of association 
( i . e . , the odds ratio)  relat ive to the other covariates is 
al so available for each logistic regression analys is . 
The next Chapter explains the resul t s  of the analyses . 
Descript ive statistics and regression analyses are provided 
to aid in understanding the formation of SHAs and the role 
that COTHs play in this relat ively new, but important 
organi zational phenomenon . 
CHAPTER 4 
Result s  
Resul ts of the data analysis used to t e s t  the proposed 
hypotheses in the preceding chapter are presented below . All 
three regress ion analyses are presented as we ll as a 
descript ive , frequency , and correlation statistics . The 
f i ndings presented in this chapter are then discussed in 
Chapter 5 .  
Descript ive and Correlation Analys i s  
Means , standard devi at ions , maximum and minimum values 
were examined to determine if any distributional problems 
exi sted within the data . Descript ive statistics of the 
cont inuous variables are shown in Table 6 whi le frequency 
stat i st i c s  are presented in Table 7 for the categorical 
vari ables . No serious problems were ident i f ied . 
The categorical variables in the study were examined to 
as sure that all possible responses were represented for each 
dichotomous response of the dependent variables (Hosmer & 
Lemeshow , 1 9 8 9 ) . 
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Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations for Cont inuous Variabl es (n- 2 7 4 )  
variable Mean Std . Dev . 
Percent managed care penetration 0 . 2 2 0 . 1 2 
Percent large employers> 0 . 0 9 0 . 04 
Rival hospitals per 1 , 0 0 0  population> 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 3  
Percent SHA penetration> 0 . 6 6 0 . 2 4 
Percent large group practices> 0 . 2 1  0 . 1 6 
Primary Care Phys ician per Capita> 0 . 3 2  0 . 0 3 
Number of FTEs per Bed' 2 . 54 1 . 1 7 
Case Mix' 1 .  63  0 . 2 1  
Net Patient Revenue' 1 1 , 734 6 , 2 2 2  
Number o f  Services' 5 9 . 0  9 . 5 5 
Per capita income> 2 0 , 3 2 6  3 , 2 2 8  
Percent minority> 0 . 2 1  0 . 1 0 
Percent e l derly> 0 . 12 0 . 02 
Notes . + Variables measured at the MSA l evel 
* Variables measured at the hospital l evel 
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Table 7 
Freguency of Categorical Variables (n=2 7 4) 
Variable Category Frequency Percent 
SRA member 






















182 0 . 6 6 
92 
1 1 9  
1 5 5  
1 5 7  
1 1 7  
1 6 6  
1 0 8  
2 5 1  
2 3  
1 8 8  
8 6  
1 1 3  
5 7  
7 1  
3 3  
0 . 3 4 
0 . 4 3  
0 . 5 7 
0 . 5 7 
0 . 4 3  
0 . 6 0 
0 . 4 0  
0 . 92 
0 . 0 8 
0 . 6 9 
0 . 3 1 
0 . 4 1  
0 . 2 1 
0 . 2 6 
0 . 1 2 
Notes .  A l l  variables measured at the hospital l evel except 
the business coal ition variable .  
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Correlation coefficients were examined for the 
independent continuous variables to detect potent ial 
mul t i col l inearity . Mul ticoll inearity exi sts when two 
independent variables are highly correl ated . This could l ead 
to overlooking a potent ial influent ial variable because i t s  
e f fect may be absorbed by other correlated variables . The 
popul at ion variable was found to be highly correlated ( 0 . 97 )  
with the number of general acute care hospitals in the 
market . Weaker correlations were found between the 
populat ion and per capita income as wel l  as the percent 
minority in the market , 0 . 5 1 and 0 . 5 0 respect ively . A third 
high correlation was found between the number of hospitals 
and the percent of minority population ( O . S O ) . Based upon 
these findings , variables measuring the populat ion and the 
number of hospitals in the market were deleted from a l l  of 
the analyses . Since the market ' s  s i ze and number of rival 
hospitals in the market are conceptually important factors 
in developing a partnering strategy, a new variable - -number 
of hospital per 1 , 0 0 0 - -was created to measure the exis t ence 
of rival hospitals adj ust ing for the market ' s  s i ze . 
Correlat ion analysis with this new variable showed no 
correlations exceeding r = 0 . 5 0 .  
Data transformat ions were performed on three 
independent variables . To minimize the presence of non­
normal distributions in the variables (Mendenhal l  & S inci c h ,  
1 9 9 3 ) . Spec if ically, net revenue was log - adj usted and both 
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SRA penetration and managed care penetration were changed t o  
nominal variables based on their quart i l e  values . 
The lowest level of SRA penetration (Q1 )  were market s  
that had less than 5 5 %  o f  the pat ient days controlled by 
SRAs . The next two levels of SRA penetration ( Q2 and Q3 ) 
were' 1 )  market s  with at least 55% and less than 74 % ,  and 2 )  
market s  with at l east 7 4 %  and less than 79% of the pat ient 
days under the control of SRA hospital s . The highest l evel 
of SRA penetration ( Q4 )  were markets that had 79% or more or 
the market ' s  patient days controlled by hospitals 
part i c ipat ing in SRAs . 
The lowest level of HMO penetration (Q1 )  were market s  
that had less than 1 5 %  o f  the market ' s  populat ion in 
part i cipat ing in HMOs . The next two l evels of HMO 
penetration (Q2 and Q3 ) were 1 )  market s  with at l east 1 5 %  
and less than 1 9 % ,  and 2 )  markets with a t  least 1 9 %  and less 
than 28% of the populat ion enrol led in managed care plans . 
The highest level of HMO penetrat ion ( Q4 )  were market s  that 
had 2 8 %  or more or the market ' s  population enrol led in HMOs . 
Analys i s  1 :  COTH Part icipat ion in SRAs 
The f irst analysi s  tested the f i rst two hypotheses ,  
namely whether coercive market pressures are pos it ively and 
normat ive organi zat ional pressures negatively correl ated and 
with COTH part i cipation in SHAs . Data were avai lable for a 
total of 2 74 teaching hospitals included in thi s analys i s . 
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Logi stic regression was used t o  model the data and 
ident i fy signi ficant relationships . Recal l that the 
dependent variable of interest in the f irst analys is was 
COTH part i cipat ion in SHAs . A variable where the probab i l ity 
of the Chi - square tests stat istic was less than 0 .· 0 5  were 
cons idered to be signi f icantly associated with the dependent 
variabl e .  The parameter est imates , the standard error, and 
stati stical signi ficance for all the variables in the model 
are presented in Table 8 .  
There were three s igni f i cant explanatory variables in 
the model measuring SHA part i cipat ion .  Two of the 
s igni f i cant variables represent coercive market forces that 
COTHs face in the environment . The signi f icant market 
variables included the percentage of large employers in the 
market , and the percentage of total pat ient days in the 
market control led by SHAs , measured by SHA penetrat ion . 
The f irst variable ,  percent of l arge employers , was 
shown to have a posi t ive relat ionship with SHA 
part i cipation ,  which i s  consistent with the hypothes i zed 
rel a t ionship for a coercive variable . Reasons for thi s and 
the other f indings presented in this Chapter are discussed 
det a i l  in the next Chapter . 
Table 8 
Logi s t i c  Parameter Est imates of Teaching Hospital 
Part i c ipation in Strategic Hospital Al l i ances (n-2 74) 
Est imate 
Coerc ive Market Measures 
Bus i.ness coalition - 0 . 0 2 0  
Percent managed care penetration 
Highest to Lowest (Q4 to Q 1 )  - 0 . 2 0 2  
2nd highest to Lowest ( Q3 to Q1 )  - 0 . 2 2 5  
3 rd highest to Lowest (Q2 to Q1 )  - 0 . 0 2 9  
Percent large employers 13 . 9 9 7  * 
Rival hospitals per 1 , 0 0 0  pop . - 1 3 . 7 93 
Percent SHA penetration 
Highest to Lowest ( Q4 to Q1 )  - 2 . 2 73 
2nd highest to Lowest ( Q3 to Q1 )  - 0 . 3 95 * * *  
3 rd highest to Lowest ( Q2 to Q1 )  0 . 57 0  
Large group pract ices 1 . 8 1 9  
Primary care phys ician per capita - 6 . 3 0 9  
Normat ive Organizat ional Measures 
Ownership 0 . 4 6 0  
Administrative structure - 0 . 1 24 
Number of FTEs per bed 0 . 0 8 1  
Case mix - 0 . 64 4  
Net patient revenue - 0 . 92 7  * 
Number of services - 0 . 0 03 
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S E  
0 . 2 0 3 
0 . 3 4 6  
0 . 3 7 9  
0 . 3 3 5  
6 . 3 3 0  
5 8 . 0 9 1  
0 . 4 3 6  
0 . 3 6 5  
0 . 3 5 0  
1 . 4 4 9  
7 . 4 2 1  
0 . 3 04 
0 . 1 9 9  
0 . 1 5 6  
0 . 9 1 9  
0 . 4 5 7  
0 . 02 2  
Table 8 ( cont ' d ) 
Logi stic Parameter Est imates of Teaching Hospital 




West to Northeast 
South to Northeast 




R2 = 0 . 2 9 9  
Notes . Q1 ,  
* * *  
* *  
* 
Q2 ,  Q3 ,  Q4 = 1 at , 
signi fi cant at 
signi f i cant at 
signi fi cant at 
Est imate 
0 . 0 0 0 1  
1 . 162 
0 . 4 9 3  * *  
- 0 . 6 0 2  
- 0 . 9 8 6  
7 . 8 5 6  
7 . 0 1 1  
2nd , 3rd and 4th quart i les 
p < O . O O l  
p < 0 . 0 0 5  
p<0 . 0 5 
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S E  
0 . 0 0 0 1  
0 . 44 2  
0 . 4 5 2  
0 . 4 3 4  
2 . 2 4 9  
1 0 . 5 0 5  
4 . 9 6 1  
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The ef fect of the other signi ficant coercive variable 
was contrary to what was expected- - finding of a negative 
rel ationship between high levels of SHA penetration 
(measured as a nominal variable by quart i les of penetrat i on)  
and SHA part icipation . Though not s igni ficant , the analys i s  
showed that lower SHA penetrat ion was pos i t ively associated 
with SHA part i cipat ion . Looking at only the signi f icant 
relat ionship , it would appear that as SHA penetration 
increases , it  becomes less l ikely that COTHs become members 
of SHAs . One poss ible implication of this finding is that 
when SHA penetrat ion reaches high l evel s  it may be too late 
for COTHs to f ind partners . 
The third signi f i cant expl anatory variable was on the 
normat ive side - - the organi zat ional measure , net revenue ( a  
measure of the COTH ' s  inpatient and outpat ient volume ) . 
Results show a signi f icant negative relationship with SHA 
part i c ipat ion .  As hypothesi zed , increases in net revenues 
are expected to have a negative rel ationship with COTH 
part i cipation in SHAs . 
None of the other independent explanatory variables 
were s igni f icantly related to SHA part i cipation . Howeve r ,  
one of the control variables was s igni ficant . COTHs in the 
West were found to be more likely to part i c ipate in SHAs as 
compared to COTHs in the Northeast . 
These findings thus provide only l imited support for 
the f irst two hypotheses that COTH part ic ipation in SHAs i s  
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posit ively assoc iated with coercive pressures and negat ively 
assoc iated with normat ive pressures . 
Analysis 2 :  Market Dominance of COTHs 
In the second analys i s ,  the two hypotheses that address 
the market posi t ion of COTHs are examined, speci f ically,  
that coerc ive market pressures are positively and normat ive 
pressures within the organi zat ion are negat ively associated 
with COTH market dominance . Again, logi stic regression was 
used and the parameter est imates were examined for 
s igni f i cance and direct ion . As shown on Table 9 ,  there were 
four s igni fi cant explanatory variables . 
Three market variable s ,  the percent of primary care 
phys i c i ans , the proportions of phys icians in large groups , 
and the level of SHA penetration in the market were a l l  
s igni f i cantly associated with COTH market dominance .  
Contrary to what was expected the percent of primary care 
physi c i ans were negatively associated with COTH market 
dominance . Alternat ively, the percentage of physic ians i n  
large group practices was posi t ively as sociated with COTH 
SHAs having a market dominant posit ion . The SHA penetration 
variable showed the same pattern as in the f irst analys i s  
with the notable exception that a l l  leve l s  of SHA 
penetration were signi ficant . Low and medium l evel s  of SHA 
penetration were posit ively rel ated to SHA membership whi l e  
high l evel s  had a negative relationship . Thus , as the 
proportion of pat ient days within markets that are 
cont rol led by SHAs increases , COTHs or their SHAs are l e s s  
l ikely to hold dominant positions within the ir markets . 
9 3  
The other two s igni ficant variables are organi zat ional 
variables that measure normat ive pressures wi thin the SHA . 
The ownership variable showed that compared with other not ­
for-profit COTHs , there was a posit ive relationship between 
for-profit COTHs and a position of market dominance . Thus , 
as expected, not - for-profit COTHs and the ir SHAs are less 
l ikely to be in posi t ions of market dominance than are the i r  
for-prof it counterpart s .  The second s igni f icant 
organi zational variable was the admini strative structure 
variable that measured whether the COTH was independent or 
integrated with the medical school . Though not ( Q4 to 
" st r i ctly" signi f i cant (p = 0 . 0 5 7 ) , it was found that 
integrated COTHs were negatively associated with a market 
dominant posit ion for the COTH or its SHA .  Both of these 
resul t s  were expected since not - for profit COTHs and COTHs 
owned by the medical schools have addit i onal organizat ional 
comp l exi ties than COTHs that are separate f rom the medical 
school , state regulations , or other restrict ions associated 
with a not - for-profit status . 
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Table 9 
Logi stic Parameter Est imates of Teaching Hospital Market 
Dominance (n 2 74) 
Est imate SE 
Coerc ive Market Measures 
Bus iness coalit ion - 0 . 2 9 5  0 . 2 0 9  
Percent managed care penetration 
Highest to Lowe st (Q4 to Q1 ) - 0 . 54 8  0 . 3 5 3  
2nd highest to Lowest (Q3 to Q1 )  0 . 0 0 5  0 . 3 5 3  
3 rd highest to Lowest (Q2 to Q1 ) 0 . 2 2 3  0 . 3 3 4  
Percent large employers - 1 0 . 3 0 0  6 . 1 8 6  
Rival hospitals per 1 , 0 0 0  pop . - 5 8 . 762 6 2 . 6 1 0  
Percent SRA penetration 
Highest to Lowest (Q4 to Q1 )  - 1 . 44 5  * * *  0 . 3 64 
2nd highest to Lowest (Q3 to Q 1 )  1 . 0 9 1  * *  0 . 3 6 2  
3rd highest to Lowest ( Q2 to Q1 )  1 . 2 9 0  * * *  0 . 3 8 4  
Large group pract i ces 3 . 4 74 * 1 . 4 6 0  
Primary care phys ician per capita - 2 7 . 44 6  * *  8 . 7 1 7  
Normat ive Organi zational Measures 
Ownership 1 . 022 * *  0 . 3 4 6  
Administrat ive structure - 0 . 3 6 8  0 . 1 94 
Number of FTEs per bed 0 . 0 1 9  0 . 1 6 8  
Case mix - 1 .  6 4 1  0 . 94 6  
Net pat i ent revenue+ - 0 . 6 8 9  0 . 4 5 4  
Number o f  services - 0 . 04 1  0 . 0 2 2  
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Table 9 ( cont ' d )  
Logi stic Parameter Est imates of Teaching Hospital Market 




West to Northeast 
South to Northeast 




R2 = 0 . 3 4 3  
Not e s . Q1 ,  Q2 ,  Q3 , Q4 
* * *  
* *  
* 
Est imate SE 
0 , 0 0 02 0 . 0 0 0 1  
- 0 . 2 13 0 . 4 1 9  
- 1 . 1 1 6  0 . 52 2  
* 
0 . 6 0 5  0 . 4 0 6  
6 . 4 5 0  * *  2 . 2 8 6  
- 9 . 93 5  9 . 6 6 6  
1 7 . 8 3 4  * * *  5 . 4 1 0  
signi f icant a t  p < O . O O l  
s igni f icant a t  p < 0 . 0 0 5  
signi f icant a t  p<0 . 0 5 
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In sum, the s igni f icant market variables provide mixed 
support for hypothesis three . Whi l e  low l eve l s  of SHA 
penetration and the percent of phys icians in large groups 
was positively associated " with COTH market dominance , the 
percentage of primary care physic ians had an inverse 
relationship . However,  the two signi fi cant organi zat ional 
variabl es , not - for-prof i t  and an integrated administrat ive 
structure , were bot h ,  as expected, negatively related to 
dominant market posit ions . Thus , this analys i s  provided 
support for hypothesis four . 
Analysis 3 :  Organi zat ional Dominance of COTHs 
The third analys i s  examined the last two hypotheses 
that , for teaching hospitals in an SHA, coercive market 
pressures would be posi tively and normat ive organizat ional 
pressures , negat ively associated with an organi zat ional 
dominant position for COTHs within their respective SHAs . 
For this analys i s ,  only COTHs that were part of SHAs were 
included (n = 1 8 2 ) ." Three explanatory variables were 
signi f icant in the model ( see Table 1 0 ) , namely COTH ' s  
ownership , COTH administrat"ive structure and the SHA 
penetrat ion in the market . 
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Table 1 0  
Logistic Parameter Est imates of Teaching Hospital 
Organi zational Dominance in Strategic Hospital Al liances (n= 1 8 2) 
Est imate SE 
Coerc ive Market Measures 
Bus iness coalit ion 0 . 1 8 9  . 0 . 3 3 4  
Percent managed care penetration 
Highest to Lowest (Q4 to Q 1 )  - 0 . 2 7 7  0 . 5 9 0  
2nd highest to Lowest ( Q3 to Q 1 )  0 . 62 9  0 . 6 3 5  
3rd highest to Lowest (Q2 to Q1 ) - 0 . 74 7  0 . 54 1  
Percent l arge employers 0 . 4 8 6  1 1 . 5 3 4  
Rival hospitals per 1 , 0 0 0  pop . - 3 3 . 3 1 0  
1 1 0 . 3 4 8  
Percent SRA penetration 
Highest to Lowest ( Q4 to Q 1 )  - 1 . 4 12 * 0 . 5 9 1  
2nd highest to Lowest (Q3 to Q 1 )  0 . 9 0 7  0 . 7 6 7  
3rd highest to Lowest ( Q2 to Q 1 )  0 . 1 7 6  0 . 6 3 0  
Large group practices 2 . 3 2 4  2 . 6 9 9  
Primary Care physician per capita - 1 1 . 4 0 6  1 1 . 6 9 5  
Normat ive Organizat ional Measures 
Ownership 1 . 3 2 6  * 0 . 6 6 2  
Administrative structure 1 . 0 4 7  * *  0 . 3 2 0  
Number of FTEs per bed 0 . 8 9 8  0 . 4 7 8  
Case mix 2 . 7 8 9  1 . 7 7 3  
Net patient revenue· - 0 . 9 7 1  0 . 7 5 9  
Number of services - 0 . 0 2 6  0 . 0 3 6  
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Table 1 0  ( cont ' d) 
Logi s t i c  Parameter Est imates of Teaching Hospi tal 
Organi zational Dominance in Strategic Hospi tal Al l iances (n- 1 8 21 
Est imate Std . 
Error 
Control Measures 
I ncome 0 . 0 0 0 1  0 . 0 0 0 2  
Region 
West to Northeast 0 . 3 4 0  0 . 8 6 3  
South t o  Northeast - 1 . 0 6 8  * 0 . 7 3 4  
Midwest t o  Northeast 1 . 4 4 7  0 . 6 9 9  
Minority 1 . 3 8 9  4 . 04 4  
Elderly 1 0 . 6 0 1 5 . 9 4 5  
I ntercept 7 . 1 53 7 . 8 1 0  
R2 = 0 . 2 6 8  
Notes . Q1 ,  Q2 ,  Q3 , Q4 = 1 st ,  2nd , 3rd and 4th quart i l es 
* *  signi f i cant at p < O . 0 0 5  
* signi f i cant a t  p<O . 0 5  
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The only signit icant coercive market pressure measure 
was the variable SHA penetration . Once again, this variable 
showed the same ef fect as the previous analyses . Only the 
highest level of SHA penetrat ion was found to be 
s igni f i cant . The e f fect of high l evels of SHA penetration 
was negat ive , while lower levels , though not signi f i cant , 
had a pos it ive e f fect . 
For-profit COTHs were found to have a s igni ficant 
relat ionship with COTHs having organi zat ionally dominant 
posi t ions in their SHAs . Also , compared to integrated COTHs , 
independent teaching hospitals were signi ficantly associated 
with having organi zat ionally dominant positions in the i r  
SHAs . Thi s  supports the hypothesis that greater normat ive 
pressure cons istent with not - for-prof it status and 
integrated administrat ive structures i s  associated with COTH 
hospitals having weaker positions within their SHAs . 
Thi s  analys is provided no support for the hypothes i s  
that coerc ive pressures i n  the market were related to 
organi zat ional dominance .  However ,  the two organizat ional 
variables supported the hypothesis that there is an 
associat ion between normat ive pressures and organi zat ional 
dominance . 
CHAPTER 5 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to examine the 
relationship between market and organi zat ional factors in 
the health care envi ronment and the strategic positions of 
the nat ion ' s  teaching hospital s . These hospitals have an 
important role in not only providing patient care , but 
t raining future phys icians and conducting research . They are 
also , in many cases , the safety net for people without 
insurance . It is thus imperative to understand how rapid 
changes in the health care environment are impact ing 
teaching hospitals . 
Three questions were specifically asked regarding 
teaching hospitals and the changing environment : 
1 .  What organizational and market characteri stics are 
associated with teaching hospitals part i c ipat ing in 
hospital networks? 
2 .  What organizational and market characteristics are 
assoc iated with the strategic pos it ions that teaching 
hospitals have achieved within their local markets?  
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3 .  What organizational and market characteristics are 
associated wi·th the organi zat ional posit ions of teaching 
hospitals within their strategic hospital all iances? 
To examine these questions , six hypotheses were developed 
and analyzed.  
Thi s  chapter uses the resul ts presented in the 
preceding chapter to evaluate the hypotheses and research 
questions . A summary of the three analyses is presented in 
Table 1 1 . The table shows the direction of associat ion for 
each of the signi f icant variables along with the 
hypothes i zed direction of those variabl es . This chapter 
examines these findings within and across the three 
analyses . Conclusions are derived regarding the influences 
of both coercive and normative pressures on COTHs with 
regard to their part i c ipat ion in SHAs as wel l  as their 
market and organi zat ional positions . The chapter also 
describes the l imi tations of the study as wel l  as 
impl i cations and conclusions that can be drawn . Sugges t i ons 
for further research are then presented . 
Table 1 1  
Summary of Signi f i cant Explanatory Variables and the i r  




Not - for -profit Ownership 
Integrated COTHs 
SRA· Penetration 
Q1 to Q4 + 
Q2 to Q4 + 
Q3 to Q4 + 
Managed Care Penetration 
Q1 to Q4 + 
Q2 to Q4 + 
Q3 to Q4 + 
Percent Large Employers + 
Net Revenue 
No . o f  Hospital Servi ces 
Large group pract ices + 
% Primary Care Physic ians + 
Not e s . SRA Strategic Hospital Al l iance 
MD Market Dominance 
OD Organizat ional Dominance 







1 0 2  
OD 
1 0 3  
Inf luence o n  SHA Part icipation 
To answer the first question ,  the analyses examined the 
f i rst and second hypotheses that coercive market pressures 
would be pos it ively related and normative organizational 
pressures negat ively related to COTH part i cipation in S HAs . 
Two market variables were found to be signi fi cant : SHA 
penetrat ion (negat ive ) and the proportion of l arge employers 
in the market (pos i t ive ) . 
The signi fi cant parameter est imate for the employer 
variable suggests that larger employers may exert strong 
coercive pressures on COTHs . Large employers thus appear to 
have the abil ity to influence how health care services 
within their markets are structured and delivered, more 
part i cularly for this study, the degree to which COTHs 
part i c ipate in SHAs . 
The second s igni fi cant variable , SHA penetrat ion ,  had a 
negat ive ef fec� , contrary to expectat ions , when comparing 
the highest ( >  0 . 7 9 )  to the lowest « 0 . 5 5 )  levels of SHA 
penetration . Thi s  suggests that as SHA hospitals control 
more and more of the total pat ient days within their 
markets , teaching hospitals ' may find it increasingly 
d i f f i cult to form or become members of SHAs . The val idity of 
this explanat ion would be increased were one to as sume that 
teaching hospital s are relat ively slower in reacting to 
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market changes and , more particularly , i n  forming or 
part i c ipat ing in SHAs . Therefore , in those markets in whi c h  
SHA formation i s  re lat ively more advanced compared t o  
market s  which may , a t  this point , have l imited SHA 
formation, teaching hospitals may find it diff i cult to f ind 
partners or to ident i fy compatible local systems to j oi n .  
Alternat ively, the finding for SHA penetration could be 
the resul t of a missing third variable - - market s i ze . S ince 
SHA penetrat ion tends to be higher in larger market s ,  the 
f i nding could mean that COTHs located in l arger market s  
( where SHA penetrat ion is also higher) are less l ikely to be 
members of SHAs . It could be , for example , that in the 
l arger markets COTHs are more l ikely to remain niche 
players , cons istent with their tertiary and quaternary care 
rol e s . It is reasonable to assume that niche pos i t ions can 
be sustained in the larger markets ,  given the rel at ively 
greater numbers of referring hospitals and, overal l ,  greater 
demand for specia l i zed and complex services in those 
markets . Therefore , COTHs that are located in large market s  
may b e  less l ikely, compared t o  those in smaller marke t s , t o  
assume leadership roles i n  forming local systems , 
preferring , instead , to seek referrals from the forming 
l ocal systems and leaving to community hospitals the 
l eadership role in forming systems . 
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One organi zat ional variable was found t o  be 
s igni fi cant . As expected , net pat ient revenue was negat ively 
rel ated to COTH part icipat ion in SHAs . In this study , l arger 
revenues were assumed to ref lect higher pat ient volumes , 
which was considered to be an indicator of complexity or 
normat ive pressures . This finding could suggest that COTHs 
with higher net pat ient revenue may have less need to 
rel inquish autonomy and j oin SHAs , given the stabil i ty they 
attain from large pat ient volumes and overal l  greater 
f inancial solvency . By itsel f ,  however ,  this finding only 
minimally supports the second hypothesi s . More evidence 
would be needed to support the finding of the effects of 
normat ive pressures on COTH hospital parti c ipation in SHAs . 
Inf luence on COTH Market Dominance 
Three signi ficant market variables were found in the 
second analysis , providing support for hypotheses three and 
four . One of the signi ficant coercive variables was the 
percentage of physicians in large physician groups ( groups 
with 2 0  or more physicians ) . Higher levels of phys ic ian 
part i cipat ion in l arge group practices indicates greater 
l eve l s  of consolidation within physician market s ,  which i s  
l ikely to b e  associated with higher level s  o f  rivalry and 
aggres s iveness within physician markets (Alexander,  
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Morri sey, & Shortel l , 1 9 8 6 ) . The presence o f  phys ician 
market s  tends also to be pos it ively associated with managed 
care penetrat ion , even , poss ibly, fac i l i tat ing the 
development of managed care within markets . All of this i s  
hypothesi zed t o  drive COTHs t o  part ic ipate in ever - s tronger 
( larger and more dominant ) SHAs . It may also be necessary 
for COTHs to j oin SHAs in order to assure access to 
referral s  from other 1arge primary care and specialty 
physi c i an groups within their markets . 
Finally, it should be noted that a tautology could be 
part ly respons ible for this finding . Many COTHs have very 
l arge physician groups associated wi th them, which fact 
would contribute directly to higher percentages of 
phys icians part icipat ing in large phys ician groups ( the 
independent variable in this case) and , by extension , 
account for some of the observed posit ive association 
between market dominance and the physician group variable . 
The second finding was that the ratio of primary care 
physi c i ans was signi f i cantly and negat ively related to COTHs 
or their SHAs having dominant market posit ions , a finding 
that was contrary to expectat ions . On the one hand , this 
finding could suggest that relat ively greater numbers of 
primary care physic ians to specialists could enhance the 
referral bases for COTHs , thereby improving the ir economic 
c l imate . Under such circumstances , COTHs could have less 
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need to evolve into dominat ing pos it ions ( in part , through 
the format ion of SHAs ) within the ir markets in order to 
survive . I f  true , this explanation suggest s  that origina l ly 
we may have interpreted the primary care variable 
incorrectly to represent a negative coercive effect , when i t  
may actually have a pos i t ive effect . This i s  indicat ive o f  a 
general di fficulty in forming hypotheses using physician 
variables . Phys icians often play mul t iple and somet imes 
conf l ict ing roles within markets . They can be both " f riends " 
( referral sources ) to COTHs as wel l  as " foes "  ( competitors ) 
to them . 
The third signi fi cant coercive market variable is SHA 
penetration . The analys is found that as SHA penetrat ion 
grew , COTHs or their SHAs were less l ikely to have market 
dominant posit ions . A pos it ive rel ationship was found for 
the two lower levels of SHA penetrat ion while at the highest 
level of SHA penetrat ion a negative relat ionship was found . 
As before , this could be due to the challenge COTHs have in 
moving quickly to j oin SHAs , even SHAs that dominate thei r  
marke t s . Given the constraints they face rel at ive to othe r ,  
more nimble and aggress ive hospi"tal s ,  COTHs and the ir SHAs 
may s imply be overwhelmed by these other market players . 
They would be even more challenged in market s  that are 
relat ively more advanced in terms of SHA format ion . 
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On the organizational side , the analys i s  showed that 
for - profit COTHs were signi f i cantly more likely to be in 
market dominant pos it ions , by comparison to not - for-pro f i t  
COTHs . Not - for-profit COTHs may b e  somewhat more constrained 
in choosing partners and expanding generally . Such COTHs 
genera l ly have more complicated organizat ional structures ,  
stronger and more l imiting miss ions , and less access to the 
capital needed for system formation (Heysel l ,  1 98 4 ; Munson, 
Choi , & Allison , 1 9 8 6 ) . This could result in their forming 
SRAs that achieve less dominant market pos it ions . Put 
another way , for-profit COTHs may enj oy more freedom ( i . e . , 
less normat ive constraint s )  in seeking partners that wi l l  
enhance their positions i n  the markets . 
Though not ful ly signi f icant (p = 0 . 0 5 7 ) , the ef fect of 
the administrat ive structure variable i s  worth noting . For 
reasons similar to those ident i fied above , the finding 
suggests integrated COTHs may be less abl e  to achieve 
posi t i ons of market dominance than are their independent 
counterparts .  Integrated COTHs , by def inition, face higher 
l evel s  of normat ive constraints ,  s ince for them the medical 
schools and the hospitals share ownership . These comp l i cated 
interrelat ionships could interfere with the abil ity of 
integrated COTHs to make the dec i s ions and strategic choices 
necessary for them to achieve pos itions of market dominance .  
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Influence on Organi zational Dominance 
The third analys is found one coercive market variable 
and two normative organizat ional variables to be 
s igni fi cant . The coerc ive market variable ,  the percent of 
SHA. penetration in the market , was inversely related to COTH 
organi zational dominance . Thus , in market s  with higher 
l eve l s  of SHA penetrat ion, COTHs were less l ikely to have 
achieved positions of dominance within their SHAs . (Recal l ,  
that organi zat ional dominance was measured as the percent of 
the SHA that the COTH control led through its ownership of 
part i cipat ing hospital s . )  As in the analysis of COTH 
part i c ipation in SHAs , this finding is consi stent with the 
explanation of a third variable - - market s i ze . In this 
case , it may be that in the larger market s  ( where there i s  
a l so higher SHA penetration ,  overal l ) , those COTHs that do 
part ic ipate in SHAs are l ikely to be as sociated with l arger 
and greater numbers of hospital partners than would be the 
case for COTHs located in smaller markets . The former COTHs 
woul d  therefore represent relat ively lesser percentages o f  
their S HA ' s  total pat ient days and thus b e  organi zat ionally 
less dominant within the ir SHAs . 
Two organi zational variables - - ownership and 
administrat ive structure - - were found to be s igni f i cant i n  
t h i s  analys i s . Both had the expected relationship to COTH 
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organi zat ional dominance . Compared t o  for-profit s ,  not - for­
pro f i t  COTHs were less l i kely to dominate the ir SHAs . This 
may be due , again, to a lack of freedom in choosing partners 
or to maneuver quickly in the marketpl ace . Thus , instead of 
forming SHAs by acqui si tion and merger , not - for-prof i t  COTHs 
are more l ikely to j oin exi st ing SHAs and through looser 
structural arrangement s .  As a result , these COTHs could end 
up in less dominant organi zat ional positions . 
The administrat ive structure variable indicates that 
integrated COTHs were less l i kely than independent COTHs to 
dominate their SHAs . To the extent that COTHs not owned by 
the i r  medical schools have greater independence and more 
e f f i c ient decision-making processes , they are more l i kely to 
engage in mergers , acqui sit ions , and expansions , a l l  of 
which l ead to control over the hospitals that make up the i r  
SHAs . I ntegrated COTHs , o n  the other hand, because of 
constrained dec i s ion-making capacities , may be more l ikely 
to j oin as partners in the more loosely structured SHA 
forms . They would thus be measured in this study as having 
less dominant positions within their SHAs . 
Findings across Analyses 
First , it  was interest ing that the SHA penetration 
variable was s igni ficant and negative in a l l  three analyses , 
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contrary t o  expectat ions . High levels of SHA penetrat ion 
were negatively associated with SHA part icipation, market 
dominance ,  and organi zat ional dominance . In those market s  in 
which SHAs have evolved and captured greater market share s ,  
teaching hospitals appear less l ikely t o  be a part o f  the 
exi s t ing SHAs or find themselves in posi t ions of either 
market or organizat ional dominance . 
As suggested above , teaching hospital s ,  being slower 
than their communi ty hospi tal counterparts in engaging in 
s t rategic al ignment s ,  may lose opportunities to pick or j oin 
with des irable partners , especially in those market s  in 
whi ch consol idat ion act ivity is more advanced . The 
chi l dren ' s  game of mus ical chairs provides a good analogy 
here : When the "mus i c "  stops will  the slower responding 
COTHs be left without a " chai r " ? 
S igni f icant geographical dif ferences were found in the 
three analyses . With regard to SHA penetrat ion ,  COTHs in the 
West were more l i kely to be part of SHAs than were those in 
the Northeast . COTHs in the South and Midwest were more 
l ikely to have pos i t ions of market and organi zat ional 
dominance ,  respectively . Teaching hospitals in the West seem 
to be partnering with others , but without necessari ly 
gaining pos it ions of market or organi zational dominance . 
Alternat ively, COTHs in the South appear to achieve a degree . 
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of market dominance . In the Midwest , COTHs part i cipat ing in 
SHAs are more l ikely to dominate the ir SHAs . 
Though the hypotheses in this research did not focus on 
regional dif ferences among COTHs , several potential 
exp l anations for these dif ferences are of fered . First , 
Western markets have historically experienced greater 
act ivity in terms of hospital consolidation and 
restructuring . Thus , COTHs are l ikely to seek SHA 
part i cipation to keep pace with market changes and remain 
compet i t ive . In the other regions COTHs may not feel the 
same urgency to partner and thus be abl e  to seek 
partnerships that af ford them pos itions of either market or 
organi zat ional dominance .  
Overal l ,  regional variations re flect the e f fects o f  a 
number of factors , such as HMO penetration ,  SHA penetrat ion , 
phys i ci an grouping , and business coalition formation . More 
invest igation is clearly needed to ident i fy what might be 
behind the ef fect of region on the strategic behaviors of 
COTHs . 
S tudy Limitations 
There are some inherent l imitat ions in this study that 
may impact the f indings . The l imitat ions can be grouped into 
two categories - - measurement and design . 
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With respect t o  measurement , there could be 
inaccuracies in the specif i cat ion of SHAs . Some SHAs , though 
o f f i c ially announced in the trade press , may not as yet have 
come to fruition or, in the end, the announced combinations 
may not have been real i zed . This could lead to 
overestimat ing the number of SHAs . Alternatively , some SHAs 
may have been overlooked and not recorded as such . 
Nevertheless , given the general l ack of information on SHAs , 
the Williamson Ins t itute database would appear to be the 
most comprehensive and up- to - date of those currently 
ava i l able for research . 
Another l imitat ion is that some SHAs have existed for 
many years . Thus for these , their formation would not be 
directly related to the market variables . Thi s  i s  truer f or 
the more t ightly conf igured SHAs . The looser types have only 
been forming in the past three to four years . 
Another l imitation of measurement has to do with the 
as sumpt i on that market and organi zational dominance .can be 
measured using aggregate pat ient days . Such a measure 
captures a s i ze dimension of dominance ,  but overlooks other 
legal , f inancial , and structural factors that are l ikely to 
be related to organizational dominance .  On the other hand , 
the relat ive s i ze captures more directly the probabl e  
organi zat ional power that one partner may have relat ive t o  
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other partners within the SHA, which i t  was the purpose o f  
t h i s  measure a s  used i n  this study . 
Then there is the l imitation that there are other 
variabl es that represent coercive and normat ive pressures 
that , because of unavai labi l ity of dat a ,  were not included 
in this study . For example,  the percent of physicians on the 
teaching hospital ' s  board might be an important indicator of 
normat ive influence . Better measures of normat ive 
organi zational pressures could possibly produce more 
s igni f i cant findings and lead more directly to speci f i c  
organi zat ional implicat ions . 
Al so , a number of market variabl es were not measured 
that could be important . For example , the presence of strong 
I PAs , PPOs or other loosely structured network arrangements 
involving either physicians or hospi tals could have been 
associ ated with COTH strategic behaviors in their local 
marke t s . Further,  this study was , by des ign , only concerned 
with exi st ing players in the market s  ( i . e . , SHAs , phys i c i an 
groups , etc . ) .  Given the rapid pace of change , it i s  
possible that many dec isions have been driven by the 
ant i cipat ion of consolidat ions , mergers , entrance of 
competitors , penetration of managed care f i rms , etc , as much 
as by the actual market responses . 
A related l imitat ion i s  the lack of l agged variables , 
which could,  in some cases , capture more directly, the 
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pressures experienced by COTHs at the time they engaged in 
the st rategic behaviors captured in the dependent variables 
examined in this study . COTH part icipat ion in BHAs , for 
examp l e ,  could be more related to HMO penetration in the 
late 1 9 8 0 s  or very early 1 9 9 0 s  than to penetration that 
occurred at the more recent date HMO penetrat ion was 
measured in this study . Al so , there is the possibil i ty of 
endogenous and tautological relat ionships in the dat a ,  which 
use of l agged measures could have helped to minimize . Both 
HMO penetration and COTH part icipation in BHAs may not be 
independent , but rather related to other third factors 
changing in the markets . And COTH part ic ipation in BHAs 
could be tautologically related to the BHA penetration 
variable measured at the MBA level . It is interest ing that 
the relat ionship between these two variables was negative in 
al l three analyses ,  j ust the oppos ite of what woul d  be 
expected were the tautology to have had an ef fect . 
The above l imitations are also partly related to the 
cro s s - sectional design adopted for use in this study . Given 
the dynamic nature of the variables being studied , it might 
have been better had a t ime - series design been uti l i ze d .  
with the cros s - sectional design , it was only possible to 
draw causal inferences from the observed associat ions 
between the variables . A longitudinal analysi s  may have 
fac i l i tated a more direct assessment of causal 
relat ionships . Unfortunately data were unavailable for 
conduct i ng time - series analyses . 
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Final ly, the study was limi ted t o  non- federal urban 
acute care teaching hospital s .  There are a number of" other 
teaching hospitals that were not included in the study, 
including chi ldren ' s ,  specialty, and VA hospital s . Thus the 
result s  of the study can only be generali zed to the 
populat ion of acute care teaching hospitals in MSAs . 
Implicat ions 
The study provides mixed evidence that both coercive 
and normative pressures affect the strategic responses 
( e . g . , part i cipat ion in SHAs ) of teaching hospital s .  As a 
resul t , the findings provide only qua l i f i ed support for the 
use of insti tut ional theory in the study of the strategic 
behaviors of COTHs . There were no consi stent patterns of 
signi f i cant findings to reinforce support for the hypotheses 
that coercive pressures were pos it ively associated and 
normative pressures negatively associate with SHA 
part i c ipat ion ,  market dominance , or organizational 
dominance .  As discussed in the l imitat i on section ,  it may be 
that the variables used in the study did not fully capture 
coercive and normat ive pressures . Nonetheles s ,  only l imited 
evidence was found to show that coercive and normative 
pressures , as general categories of influences , are 
associated with COTHs part ic ipat ing in SHAs . 
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One could ask , i f  coercive market pressures or 
normative organi zat ional pressures are not associated with 
SHA part icipat ion, why are COTHs sacrific ing valued autonomy 
to j oin SHAs ? Given the l imited support for the hypotheses 
that coerc ive and normat ive pressures are assoc iated with 
the strategic response of teaching hospitals to the changing 
environment , a case can be made for mimetic isomorphi sm . 
Recal l that a third institut ional theory variable - - mimetic 
i somorphism -- occurs when organi zat ions attempt to model 
themselves after other s imi lar organi zations . That i s ,  COTHs 
may s imply be part i cipat ing in SHAs because other COTHs and 
communi ty hospi tals are doing so . SHA part icipat ion may be 
based more on a need to obtain any perce ived legit imacy 
associated with SHA membership . 
Mimetic isomorphism often happens because organi zat ions 
are unsure of how to react to the markets . In turbulent and 
uncertain environment s ,  mimetic i somorphic pressures may 
inf luence organizations more than coercive or normat ive 
forces .  During the rapid changes in health care many 
organi zat ions may simply have not been sure of the best 
strategic responses . They thus may have tended to mimic 
others in order to establish or maintain perceived 
l egit imacy or to increase their chances for both survival 
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and success (Gal askiewicz & Wasserman , 1 9 8 9 ) . However thi s 
study did not attempt to f ind evidence in support the 
hypothesis that mimetic pressures were associated with COTHs 
part ic ipat ing in SHAs . 
In sum this study only part ially supports the use of 
insti tut ional theory to explain the reasons for COTE; 
participation in SHAs . In future studies , either di f ferent 
theoretical frameworks or refined measures of coercive and 
normat ive pressures may need to be tested to advance our 
understanding of COTHs and their strategic decisions . 
Meanwhi le there were a number of individual findings that 
have s igni f icant implications . 
The f indings for the SHA penetration variable sugges t  
that the timing of strategic decisions may b e  crucial . The 
negative relat ionship indicates that fai lure to act in a 
t imely manner may resul t in COTHs being left out of the 
consol idat ion act ivity . Thus those that fail to bui l d  
mul t iorgani zational relat ionships could b e  placed i n  
j eopardy of losing pat ient revenues to increasingly powerful 
riva l s . 
Another important finding is the s igni f icant 
relat ionships of the ownership and administrat ive structure 
of teaching hospitals with market and organizational 
pos i t i ons . The negative relat ionships reinforces what woul d  
otherwi se b e  expected - - that teaching hospitals may need to 
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reorgani ze themselves t o  assure that they are properly 
responsive to market changes . Independent COTHs are more 
l i kely to have the abi l i ty to secure workable and 
competitively desirable interorgani zational arrangement s .  As 
impl i ed from the SHA penetration analys i s ,  wai t ing or taking 
too long to react may result in pass ing up important 
consol idation opportunities . Being able to seek partners 
early could allow for more and possibly better partner 
opt i ons . Choosing the right partners is important in terms 
of both gaining market dominance and being able to influence 
the strategic and operat ional deci s ions of the SHAs 
themselves . For the COTHs in part i cular it is important i n  
order to maintain sufficient independence and autonomy in 
ful f i l l ing their important mi ssions . 
Teaching hospitals face confl ict ing forces as they 
attempt to operate in their changing health care 
environments .  Like the ir community hospital counterpart s ,  
COTHs face a number o f  coercive pressures t o  change the way 
they operate .  However,  in addit ion, teaching hospitals face 
a number of normat ive pressures to maintain their mis s i ons 
of t raining ,  teaching and pat ient care , including serving as 
a hospi tal of last resort . The normative pressures to 
maintain these missions are l ikely a result of the 
expectat i ons that society , pol i t i cians , and other health 
Care organi zat i ons place on them . The inherent conf l i c t s  
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among these groups need t o  be managed by pol icy makers and 
hospitals execut ives . Failure to do this successful ly could 
be very detrimental to many of the nation ' s  teaching 
hospi tals as they struggle to survive in these most 
turbulent of times . It is in this environment that teaching 
hospitals must strategical ly choose how to best react within 
their health care market s  to maximi ze their positions of 
market and organi zat ional dominance . Choosing the right 
partners , for example ,  could result in signi ficant gains in 
terms of the COTHs abi l ity to control their environment s 
( see Figure 2 )  . 
More and more states are beginning to encouraging 
managed care and provider- sponsored organi zations to meet 
s t i f f , comprehensive requirement s to care for their Medicaid 
enro l l ees ( see Morri sey, 1 9 9 7 ) . Addi t ionally,  Medicare 
managed care plans are rapidly expanding and Congress i s  
l ooking for quali fied provider- sponsored organi zat ions 
( Po l zer , 1 9 9 7 ) . If teaching hospital executives and pol i cy 
makers hope to assure the continued involvement of their 
hospitals with Medicare and Medicaid enrollees , they wi l l  
need t o  reduce the normat ive constraints the COTHs uniquely 
face . By l imit ing the factors that inhibit COTHs , these 
essent ial provider organi zat ions wi l l  l ikely be free to 
react from pos itions of strength and in a t imely manner to 
the ir increasingly consolidating and compet i t ive marke t s . 
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Suggest ions for Further Research 
Thi s  study of fers insights into market and 
organi zational factors that influence the part i c ipat ion of 
COTHs in SHA organi zat ions . As health care markets cont inue 
to evolve and fewer hospital organizat ions form, there wi l l  
cont inue to be a need for research t o  better understand how 
COTHs can and wi l l  relate to their markets . Future research 
should improve upon the design of this study and investigate 
addit i onal issues related to COTHs and their environments . 
A longitudinal design could certainly improve the 
analys i s  of COTH strategic behaviors , assuming , of course , 
that adequate data can be obtained for this purpose . 
Addi t ionally,  improvements should be made in the measurement 
of coercive and normat ive pressures . Such measures should 
capture organi zat ional characteristics that are perhaps more 
important to COTHs than to any of their l ikely market 
rival s .  Better measures of hospital board and administ rat ive 
s t ructures and the constraints of the medical school , 
university, and state are especially needed . 
A critical question related to this study that needs to 
be investigated is how COTHs that part icipate in SHAs 
actually evolve in pract ice . Historically,  teaching 
hospitals have enj oyed many affil iat ions , mostly to enhance 
their teaching mi ss ions . They have done this by assuring 
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referrals and opportunities for interns and residents t o  
prac t i ce . Now , however, COTHs are forming strategic 
a f f i l i at ions to help them compete for managed care cont rac t s  
and to enhance survival i n  the market . Whether these involve 
very di f ferent partners is uncertain . Also uncertain is the 
e f fect the new strategic arrangements might have on older , 
but essent ial teaching affil iat ions . No doubt the · two forms 
of interorganizat ional arrangements involve very di f ferent 
l evel s  of organizat ional commitment and compromise . Future 
research should compare the relationships involved in the 
more purely c l inical affil iations as compared to the 
strategic partnerships . It would be important to determine 
how COTHs integrate and coordinate their services with 
c l inical versus more strategic partners and how these 
arrangements might dif fer for physician groups , hospi tal s ,  
insurers , and others . 
Final ly, it would be important to examine how the 
strategic responses of COTHs affect their pat ient care , 
teaching , and research missions as wel l  as their financ i a l , 
qual ity,  and other performance dimensions . An argument has 
been made that COTHs must adapt and change with the heal t h  
care environment to continue ful f i l l ing their missions . But 
does one necessarily lead to the other? Thus , as COTHs 
respond to market forces , it would be important to determine 
if they are indeed sol idi fying and enhancing their survival 
in a turbulent environment , whi l e  ful f i l l ing their vital 
mi ssions . 
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Appendix 1 
Independent COTH Members 
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State MSA Hospital Name 
AL Birmingham Bi rmingham Bapt ist Medi cal Cntr 
Carraway Methodist Medical Cntr 
Good Samaritan Reg Med Cntr 







St . Joseph ' s  Hosp & Med Cntr 
Tucson Medi cal Center 
Kern Medical Center 
Fresno Val ley Medical Center of Fresno 
Los Angel e s - Long Beach Long Beach Memorial Med Cntr 
Cedars- S inai Medical Center 
Hospital of The Good Samaritan 
Lac- King-Drew Medical Center 
Hunt ington Memorial Hospital 
San Diego 
San Franci s co 
San Jose 
Denver 
Green Hospital - - Scripps Cl ini c 
Cal i fornia Paci f i c  Medical Cntr 
St . Mary ' s  Hospital & Med Cntr 
Santa Clara Val l ey Medical Cntr 
Presbyterian - S t . Luke ' s  Med Cntr 
Appendix 1 ( cont ' d) 
State MSA 




DE Wi lmington 
FL Jacksonvi l l e  
Miami - Hialeah 
Orlando 
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S t . Francis Hospital & Med Cntr 
New Britain General Hospital 
Hospital of Saint Raphael 
St . Mary ' s  Hospital 
Washington Hospital Center 
Medical Center of Delaware 
St . Luke ' s  Hospital 
University Medical Center 
Mount S inai Medical Center 
Orlando Regional Medical Center 
Georgia Baptist Medi cal Center 
Medical Center of Cent Georgia 
Memorial Medical Center 
Queen ' s  Medical Center 
MacNeal Hospital 
Cook County Hospital 
















l 3 9  
Hospital Name 
I l l inois Masonic Medical Cntr 
Mercy Hospital & Medical Cntr 
Michael Reese Hosp & Med Cntr 
Mount S inai Hospital Med Cntr 
Evanston Hospital 
Lutheran General Hospital 
Memorial Medical Center 
St . John ' s  Hospital 
Methodist Hospital of Indiana 
Baton Rouge General Med Cntr 
Earl K Long Medical Center 
Ochsner Foundat ion Hospital 
Touro Infirmary 
Maine Medical Center 
Frankl in Square Hospital Cntr 
Greater Bal t imore Medical Cntr 
Johns Hopkins Bayview Med Cntr 
S inai Hospital of Baltimore 
Holy Cross Hospital 
Faulkner Hospital 
New England Deacones s  Hospital 
St . Eli zabeth ' s  Medical Center 














Minneapo l i s - S t . Paul 
Kansas City 
1 4 0  
Hospital Name 
Mount Auburn Hospital 
Berkshire Medical Center 
Baystate Medical Center 
Medical Center of Central Mas s  
Saint Vincent Hospital 
Catherine Mcauley Health Syst 
Oakwood Hospital 
Detroit Rece iving Hospital 
Henry Ford Hospital 
Hut zel Hospital 
S inai Hospital 
St . John Hospital & Med Cntr 
Wi l l iam Beaumont Hospital 
Providence Hospital 
Hurley Medical Center 
Mcl aren Regional Medical Cntr 
Blodgett Memorial Medical Cntr 
Butterworth Hospital 
Ingham General 
Hennepin County Medical Center 
St . Paul - Ramsey Medical Center 
St . Luke ' s  Hospital 
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State MSA 
St . Louis 
NV Las Vegas 







Nassau- Suf folk 
New York 
1 4 1  
Hospital Name 
Jewish Hospital of St . Louis 
St . John ' s  Mercy Medical Cntr 
University Medical Center 
Hackensack Medical Center 
St . Joseph ' s  Hosp & Med Cntr 
Monmouth Medical Center 
Jersey Shore Medical Center 
Saint Barnabas Medical Center 
Morristown Memorial Hospital 
Newark Beth I srael Med Cntr 
Overlook Hospital 
Cooper Hospital -Univ . Med Cntr 
Univers ity Hospital 
Binghamton General Hospital 
Mi l lard Fil lmore Hospit a l s  
Nassau County Medical Center 
North Shore University Hosp 
Winthrop -University Hospital 
Bronx Municipal Hospital Cntr 
Bronx- Lebanon Hospital Center 
Our Lady of Mercy Medical Cntr 
Brookdale Hospital Med Cntr 
1 4 2  
Appendix 1 ( cont ' d) 
State MSA Hospital Name 
Brooklyn Hospital Center 
Long I s l and Col l ege Hospital 
Maimonides Medical Center 
New York Methodist Hospital 
Elmhurst Hospital Center 
New York Hospital Med Cnter 
Catholic Medical Center 
Long I s l and Jewish Med Cntr 
New Rochelle Hospital Med Cntr 
Beth I srael Medical Center 
Cabrini Medical Center 
Harlem Hospital Center 
Lenox Hill  Hospital 
Metropolitan Hospital Center 
St . Luke ' s - Roosevelt Hosp Cntr 
St . Vincent ' s  Hosp & Med Cntr 
Rochester Genesee Hospital 
Rochester General Hospital 
NC Charl otte Carolinas Medical Center 
Greensboro Moses H Cone Memorial Hospital 
OH Akron Summa Health System 
Cinc innati Good Samaritan Hospital 







OK Tul sa 
OR Portland 
PA Al lentown-Bethlehem 
Erie 
Philadelphia 
1 4 3  
Hospital Name 
Cleveland C l inic Hospital 
Mt . S inai Medical Center 
Saint Luke ' s  Medical Center 
Grant Medical Center 
Riverside Methodist Hospitals 
Miami Val ley Hospital 
Kettering Medical Center 
The Toledo Hospital 
S t . E l i zabeth Hosp Med Cntr 
Western Reserve System-North 
Western Reserve System-South 
Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp 
Saint Franci s  Hospital 
Providence Medical Center 
Lehigh Val ley Hospital 
Hamot Medical Center 
Mercy Health Corporat ion 
Albert Einstein Medical Cntr 
Episcopal Hospital 
Frankford Hospital 
Germantown Hospital & Med Cntr 
Graduate Hospital 
1 4 4  
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State MSA Hospital Name 
Pennsylvania Hospital 
Crozer - Chester Medical Center 
Pitt sburgh Latrobe Area Hospital 
Mercy Hospital of Pittsburgh 
Shadyside Hospital 
St . Franci s  Medical Center 
Western Pennsylvania Hospital ' 
York York Hospital 
RI Providence Memorial Hosp of Rhode I s l and 
Miriam Hospital 
Roger William ' s  Medical Center 
SC Anderson Anderson Area Medical Center 
Columbia Richland Memorial Hospital 
Greenvi l l e - Spartanburg Greenvi l l e  Memorial Hospital 
TX Dallas Baylor Univers ity Medical Cntr 
Methodi st Medical Center 
St . Paul Medical Center 
Houston St . Luke ' s  Epi scopal Hosp i t al 
San Antonio Bexar County Hospital Distri ct 
VA Norfolk-Virginia Beach
' 
Sentara Norfolk General Hosp 
Washington Fairfax Hospital 







Charleston Area Medical Center 
Cabel l  Huntington Hospital 
S inai Samari tan Medical Cente r  
St . Luke ' s  Medical Center 
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Integrated COTH Members 
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San Franci sco 
San Jose 
CO Denver 
CN Hart ford 
Newhaven-Meriden 
DC Washington 
FL Gainesvil l.e 
Univ . of Alabama Hospital 
Univ . of South Alabama Med Cntr 
Univ . Medical Center 
Univ . Hospital of Arkansas 
UC - I rvine Medical Center 
LAC-USC Medical Center 
UCLA Medical Center 
Lorna Linda Univ.  Medical Center 
UC-Davis Medical Center 
UCSD Medical Center 
UCSF Medical center 
Stanford Univ . Hospital 
Univ . Hospital 
Univ . of Connecti cut Health Cntr 
Yale -New Haven Hospital 
George Washington Univ . Hospital 
Georgetown Univ . Hospital 
Howard Univ . Hospital 
Shands Hospital 
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State MSA 
Miami -Hialeah 
Tampa - St . Petersburg 
GA At l anta 
















Bal t imore 
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Hospital Name 
Jackson Memorial Hospital 
Tampa General Healthcare 
Crawford Long Hosp - - Emory Univ . 
Emory Univ . Hospital 
Grady Memorial Hospital 
Medical Col lege of Georgia Hosp 
Northwestern Memorial Hospi tal 
Rush- Presbyterian - St . Luke ' s  Hosp 
Univ . of Chicago Hospitals 
Univ . of I l l inoi s  Hospital 
Loyola Univ . Medical Center 
Indiana Univ . Medical Center 
Will iam N Wishard Memorial Hosp 
Univ . of I owa Hospitals 
Univ . of Kansas Hospital 
Univ . of Kentucky Hospital 
Univ . of Louisvi l l e  Hospital 
Med Cntr of Louis iana at New Orl 
Tulane Univ . Hospital 
LSU Medical Center-Univ . Hosp 
Johns Hopkins Hospital 
Univ . of Maryl & Medical System 




MI Ann Arbor 
Detroit 
MSA 







S t . Louis 
Omaha 
NJ Middlesex- Somerset 
Newark 
NY Albany- Schenectady 
Buf falo 
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Hospital Name 
Beth I srael Hospital 
Boston Univ.  Medical Center 
Brigham & Women ' s  Hospital 
Massachusetts General Hospital 
New England Medical Center 
Univ . of Massachusetts Med Cntr 
Univ . of Mi chigan Hospitals 
Grace Hospital 
Harper Hospital 
Univ . of Minnesota Hospital 
Saint Mary ' s  Hosp of Rochester 
Univ . Hospitals & Cl inics 
Univ.  & Children ' s  Hospital 
Truman Medical Center-West 
Barnes Hospi tal 
St . Louis Univ . Hospital 
Saint Joseph Hospital 
Univ . of Nebraska Medical Center 
Robert Wood Johnson Univ .  Hosp 
Univ . Hospital 
Albany Medical Center Hospital 
Buffalo General Hospital 






















Montefiore Medical Center 
1 4 9  
Univ . Hosp o f  Brooklyn - Suny Cntr 
Bel l evue Hospital Center 
Mount S inai Medical Center 
New York Univ . Medical Center 
Presbyterian Hosp- - City of New York 
Society of the New York Hospital 
Westchester County Medical Cntr 
Strong Memorial Hosp Rochester Univ . 
univ . Hospi tal - Suny Hlth S c i  Cntr 
North Carolina Baptist Hospital 
Univ . of North Carol ina Hosp 
Duke Univ . Medical Center 
Univ.  of Cincinnati Hospital 
Cuyahoga County Hospitals 
univ . Hospitals of Clevel and 
Ohio State Univ . Medical Center 
Medical Coll ege of Ohio Hospital · 
Univ.  Hospitals 
Univ . Hospital 
Penn State Univ . Hospit a l  





S C  Charleston 









Salt Lake City-Ogden 
Burl ington 
Hospital Name 
Hahnemann Univ . Hospital 
Hospital of the Univ . of PA 
Medi cal College Hospitals 
Temple Univ . Hospital 
1 5 0  
Thomas Jef ferson Univ . Hosp i t al 
Allegheny General Hospital 
Presbyterian Univ . Hospital 
Rhode 1 s l &  Hospital 
MUSC Medical Center 
Regional Med Cntr At Memphis 
Hubbard Hosp - -Meharry Med Col l ege 
Vanderbilt Univ . Hospital 
Dal las County Hospital District 
Zale Lipshy Univ.  Hospital 
Univ . of Texas Med Branch Hosp 
Harris County Hospital District 
Hermann Hospi tal 
Methodi st Health Care System 
Scott & White Memorial Hospital 
Univ . of Utah Hospital 
Med Cntr Hospital of Vermont 
Appendix 2 ( cont ' d) 
State MSA 
VA Charlottesvi l l e  




1 5 1  
Hospital Name 
Univ . of Virginia Medical Center 
Medical Col lege of Virginia Hosp 
Harborview Medical Center 
Univ . of Washington Med Cntr 
Univ . of Wisconsin Hospital 
Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hosp 
John L .  Doyne Hospital 
1 5 2  
Vita 
